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I.

INTRODUCTION

Paying for a child’s college education is the single largest financial investment a parent will make in his or her child’s future. For
many middle-income parents, this inter vivos investment in the human capital of their child replaces intergenerational transfers at
1
death in the form of bequests and inheritances. Trends in college
costs, college enrollment, and the labor market suggest that college is
more important and more expensive than ever before. Over the past
decade, college tuition increases outpaced both inflation and growth
2
in median family income. Despite this, college enrollment rates con3
tinue to grow. One reason for the failure of tuition increases to slow
enrollment is the increased financial returns associated with invest4
ments in higher education. However, these enrollment increases
∗
Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. My sincerest
thanks for the helpful comments of Martin McMahon, Tracy Kaye, Joshua Tate, Nan
Kaufman, and Joy Mullane. I am also grateful to Saint Louis University School of
Law for its generous summer research grant program.
1
See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 732–36 (1988) (arguing that for most families intergenerational wealth transmission occurs during a parent’s lifetime via the provision
of human capital rather than at death via the provision of physical capital).
2
COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 23 (2006), available at http://www.
collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/press/cost06/trends_aid_06.pdf
[hereinafter
TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006]. While tuition and fees at public four-year institutions
grew by an inflation-adjusted 52% (in constant 2005 dollars) over the past decade,
median family income grew by only 3% over the same time period. Id.
3
SANDY BAUM & KATHLEEN PAYEA, COLLEGE BOARD, EDUCATION PAYS UPDATE 3
(2005), available at http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/press/cost05/
education_pays_05.pdf. In 1970, only 21% of the population enrolled in some form
of college. Id. In 2004, over 50% of the population participated in some form of
postsecondary education. Id.
4
COLLEGE BOARD, EDUCATION PAYS 9 (2004), available at http://www.college
board.com/prod_downloads/press/cost04/EducationPays2004.pdf
[hereinafter
EDUCATION PAYS 2004]. Over the course of a forty year career, a four-year college
graduate can expect to earn 73% more in wages than the average high school gradu-

1
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and the associated earnings premiums have not been shared propor5
tionately among income groups. Students from lower-income families still lag behind their more affluent peers in postsecondary educa6
tional attainment. For many low-income families, the availability of
some form of financial assistance can be the determining factor in
7
the college enrollment decision.
Presently, the federal government subsidizes the higher education expenses of individual college students through two distribution
channels: the tax system and the transfer system. Under each subsystem, there are a multitude of programs available to assist students in
8
meeting their postsecondary educational expenses. The proliferation of these many forms of federal student aid raises issues of intraand inter-program effectiveness. In their current form, the tax benefits for higher education do not get the right amount to the right
people at the right time. The federal college spending programs, on
the other hand, get the right amount to the right people but do so in
the wrong manner. The intersection of these two financial aid distribution channels amplifies their individual deficiencies. The resulting
complex web of overlapping, contradictory, and partially or completely uncoordinated tax and spending programs impedes the government’s ability to achieve its public policy goal in providing federal
student aid, namely, to expand access to college for low income students for whom cost remains a barrier. This Article argues that significant equity, efficiency, and simplicity gains can be realized by consolidating substantially similar college tax programs and by increasing
their coordination with traditional, transfer-based forms of student
financial assistance.

ate. Id. at 11. Even a community college graduate realizes average lifetime earnings
that are approximately 25% higher than those of a high school graduate. Id.
5
BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 3, at 8. In 2003, 80% of students from families in the
highest family income quintile, 65% of students from families in the second highest
quintile, and 61% of students from families from the middle-income quintile enrolled in college. Id. Only 49% of students from families in the two lowest quintiles
combined enrolled in college. Id.
6
Id. The enrollment gap between the highest income quintile and the lowest
income quintile in 2003 was 27%. Id.
7
Unless otherwise indicated, “low-income” as used in this Article refers to families in the two lowest income quintiles during 2005, or families with incomes below
$36,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 2006 ANNUAL SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT Table HINC-05, http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/
032006/hhinc/new05_000.htm.
8
See infra Parts III.A, IV.A.
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The federal higher education spending programs are authorized
9
under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). The
HEA provides financial assistance directly to college students in the
10
form of grants, loans and work-study awards. These need-based financial aid programs are distributed on a progressive basis, with the
largest subsidies allocated to those students with the least ability to
11
pay. Targeting subsidies in this manner is not only equitable, but it
is also efficient, since lower-income students are the most price sensitive and underrepresented socioeconomic cohort in higher educa12
tion. By expanding college enrollment across the income spectrum,
the government facilitates realization of the positive externalities as13
sociated with an educated citizenry by society as a whole.
Title IV is not without its problems. Eligibility for Title IV aid is
determined under a statutorily prescribed formula that assesses the
income and assets of a family in order to determine their ability to
14
pay and their concomitant need for federal student aid. However,
complexity in this needs analysis system and in the financial aid application process itself threatens the effectiveness of these programs
and may present additional enrollment obstacles for low-income stu15
dents.
As originally enacted, the HEA promised to “give new meaning
16
That promise has been
to the phrase ‘equality of opportunity.’”
eroded over the past decade as Congress shifted its focus away from
need-based Title IV aid toward a panoply of new non-need-based
higher education tax incentives. These college tax programs can be
regressive in the distribution of their benefits, providing the largest
subsidies to higher-income families and little or no subsidy to lower17
income families. Such a pattern of distribution is not only inequitable, but also inefficient as a means of distributing educational opportunities in the American polity. It also works at cross-purposes with

9

Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 401, 79 Stat. 1219, 1232
(1965).
10
Id.
11
See infra Part III.B.
12
See infra Part II.C.
13
See infra Part II.B.
14
See infra Part III.B.
15
Id.
16
Higher Education Act of 1965: Hearings on H.R. 3220 Before the Spec. Subcomm. on
Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 89th Cong. 26 (1965) [hereinafter Hearings
on 3220] (statement of Hon. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare).
17
See infra Part IV.B.1.
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the progressive distribution of benefits observed under Title IV. The
preferred treatment that these college tax subsidies receive under Title IV’s needs analysis system exacerbates their inherent distributional
18
In certain circumstances, claiming an education-related
inequity.
tax allowance will effectively increase eligibility for Title IV needbased student aid where such need could not otherwise be demon19
strated.
Legal scholars have considered the proper treatment of higher
20
education expenses under a normatively correct income tax system.
Others have evaluated the tax benefits for higher education under
21
tax and education policy norms. Economists have long been interested in the impact of traditional forms of financial aid on college
22
enrollment and the incentive effects of the federal needs analysis
23
system under Title IV. This Article views the federal financial aid
system as an integrated whole, critically analyzing its individual parts
and their interaction with each other, and illustrates that the net ef24
fect of the various aid programs is less than the sum of its parts.

18

See infra Part V.
Id.
20
See, e.g., Loretta Collins Argrett, Tax Treatment of Higher Education Expenditures:
An Unfair Investment Disincentive, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 621 (1990); Charlotte Crane,
Scholarships and the Federal Income Tax Base, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63 (1991); David S.
Davenport, Education and Human Capital: Pursuing an Ideal Income Tax and a Sensible
Tax Policy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 793 (1992); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Human Capital Acquisition Costs—Or Why Costs of Higher Education Should Not Be Deducted or Amortized, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 927 (1993).
21
See, e.g., Ruth Lynch Buchwalter, Should 1 + 1 = 2? Does the Structure of Federal
Income Tax Expenditures for Higher Education Disadvantage Women and Low-Income Individuals?, 22 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 77 (2000); Cynthia E. Garabedian, Tax Breaks for
Higher Education: Tax Policy or Tax Pandering?, 18 VA. TAX REV. 217 (1998); Eric A. Lustig, Taxation of Prepaid Tuition Plans and the 1997 Tax Provisions—Middle Class Panacea
or Placebo? Continuing Problems and Variations on a Theme, 31 AKRON L. REV. 229 (1997);
Natasha Mulleneaux, The Failure to Provide Adequate Higher Education Tax Incentives for
Lower-Income Individuals, 14 AKRON TAX J. 27 (1999); Amy J. Oliver, Improving the Tax
Code to Provide Meaningful and Effective Tax Incentives for Higher Education, 12 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91 (2000).
22
See, e.g., Donald E. Heller, Student Price Response in Higher Education: An Update to
Leslie and Brinkman, 68 J. OF HIGHER EDUC. 624–59 (1997); Larry L. Leslie & Paul T.
Brinkman, Student Price Response in Higher Education: The Student Demand Studies, 58 J.
OF HIGHER EDUC. 181 (1987); Michael S. McPherson & Morton O. Schapiro, Does Student Aid Affect College Enrollment? New Evidence on a Persistent Controversy, 81 AM. ECON.
REV. 309 (1991).
23
See, e.g., Andrew W. Dick & Aaron S. Edlin, The Implicit Taxes from College Financial Aid, 65 J. PUB. ECON. 295 (1997); James Monks, An Empirical Examination of the Impact of College Financial Aid on Family Savings, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 189 (2004).
24
See ELAINE M. MAAG & KATIE FITZPATRICK, FEDERAL FINANCIAL AID FOR HIGHER
EDUCATION: PROGRAMS AND PROSPECTS 4 (2004) (arguing that the analysis of the fed19
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While the economic literature has begun to examine the relationship
25
between Title IV and the tax benefits for higher education, the legal
26
literature has left this important subject largely untouched.
Following this introduction, Part II will describe the history of
and justification for federal financial assistance for college students,
including a summary of the economic studies supporting the use of
financial subsidies to affect enrollments. Part III will describe the Title IV student financial aid programs, including a discussion of the
complexity endemic to the aid application process and the federal
needs analysis system. Part IV will describe the tax benefits for higher
education and analyze them under the norms of equity, efficiency
and simplicity. Part V will describe how the education-related tax
programs intersect with Title IV under the needs analysis system and
address the implications of that intersection. Part VI will illustrate
the equity, efficiency, and simplicity gains that can be realized by consolidating substantially similar tax programs and by coordinating
them with Title IV under the federal needs analysis.
II. HISTORY OF AND JUSTIFICATION FOR FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN
HIGHER EDUCATION
A. History

27

The federal government’s direct involvement in financing col28
lege students’ education is of relatively recent origin. The GI Bill of
1944 offered returning World War II veterans an unprecedented op-

eral financial assistance programs for college students “needs to proceed in an environment that examines the net effects of all the programs, taken together.”).
25
See, e.g., Leonard E. Burman et. al., The Distributional Consequences of Federal Assistance for Higher Education: The Intersection of Tax and Spending Programs (The UrbanBrookings Tax Policy Center, Discussion Paper No. 26 2005), available at http://www.
taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/311210_TPC_DiscussionPaper_26.pdf;
Susan
Dynarski, Tax Policy and Education Policy: Collision or Coordination? A Case Study of the
529 and Coverdell Saving Incentives, in 18 TAX POL’Y & THE ECON. 81, 105 (James M. Poterba ed., 2004); Susan Dynarski, Who Benefits from the Education Savings Incentives? Income, Educational Expectations and the Value of the 529 and Coverdell, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 359
(2004) [hereinafter Dynarski, Who Benefits]; Thomas J. Kane, Beyond Tax Relief: LongTerm Challenges in Financing Higher Education, 50 NAT’L TAX J. 335 (1997); Thomas J.
Kane, Savings Incentives for Higher Education, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 609 (1998); MAAG &
FITZPATRICK, supra note 24.
26
But see Buchwalter, supra note 21, at 88–89.
27
See LAWRENCE E. GLADIEUX & ARTHUR M. HAUPTMAN, THE COLLEGE AID
QUANDARY: ACCESS, QUALITY, AND THE FEDERAL ROLE 14–37 (1995) (providing thorough treatment of history of federal student aid programs).
28
Id. at 14.
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29

portunity to attend college. The first real widespread democratiza30
tion in higher education came with the passage of the HEA of 1965.
Passed during the tenure of President Lyndon B. Johnson, the HEA
promised to increase access to higher education for qualified stu31
dents by reducing or eliminating financial barriers thereto. In proposing the HEA, President Johnson hoped to “give new meaning to
32
the phrase ‘equality of opportunity.’” The goal of increasing access
to higher education for economically disadvantaged students was the
public policy goal supporting this new substantial federal financial
commitment to higher education.
The need-based student financial aid programs under Title IV
33
came in three forms: grants, loans and work-study programs. The
grant program was designed “to assist in making available the benefits
of higher education to qualified high school graduates of exceptional
financial need, who for lack of financial means of their own or of
their families would be unable to obtain such benefits without such
34
The HEA also authorized a federally guaranteed loan proaid.”
gram that expanded credit opportunities and reduced the cost of
35
borrowing for qualified college students.
The federal work-study
program subsidized the part-time salaries of eligible college stu36
dents.
Issues of middle-income affordability have always simmered below the surface of higher education debates. While Congress contemplated enacting the HEA, the most substantial federal financial
commitment to need-based student aid, it also considered several tax
relief proposals designed to relieve the financial burden of college on

29

GLADIEUX & HAUPTMAN, supra note 27, at 14.
Id. at 15.
31
Id. The HEA of 1965 can be viewed as part of President Johnson’s anti-poverty,
anti-welfare, Great Society initiatives, which sought to deal with the poverty problem
by offering poor persons the opportunity to better their station in life through work,
training and/or education. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare
Politics: The Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, in MAKING WORK PAY: THE
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICA’S FAMILIES, 15, 16–18 (Bruce
D. Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin eds., 2001).
32
Hearings on 3220, supra note 16.
33
See generally Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 401, 79 Stat.
1219, 1232 (1965).
34
Id. § 401. These grants were called Educational Opportunity Grants and were
administered through the institutions rather than being distributed directly to or for
the benefit of the student as grants under the successor Pell grant program are distributed today. Id.
35
See generally id. §§ 421–440.
36
Id. §§ 441–442.
30
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37

middle-income families. During the 1965 HEA congressional hearings, several congressman expressed concern about whether the HEA
programs would do enough for middle-income families, whom one
38
Congressman proclaimed to be “the backbone of this country.” In
response, Commissioner of Education Keppel indicated that the first
order of priority for the federal government was to expand postsecondary educational opportunities for students from lower-income
39
families. He concluded with the following statement: “I do not wish
to suggest that all of us are not sympathetic with the problems of middle-income families . . . . The problem is what is the wisest public pol40
icy at this time.”
The concern for “middle income families who pay taxes, but by
and large are excluded from participation in the student financial aid
programs” surfaced again during subsequent HEA reauthorization
41
hearings. In 1978, in order to placate those legislators calling for
higher education tax benefits to relieve “middle-income squeeze,”
Congress enacted the Middle Income Student Assistance Act
42
MISAA expanded need-based grant eligibility into the
(MISAA).
middle-income range and removed financial need as an eligibility re43
Alquirement for subsidized federally guaranteed student loans.
though need was reintroduced as a criteria for receiving subsidized
44
student loans in 1981, concern for the plight of the politically influential middle class remained. During the rest of the 1980s, grant aid
declined, loan volume grew, and the overall purchasing power of stu45
dent aid began to erode. Although legislators voiced concern about
these trends, they came up with no alternatives as tuition growth at
37

Hearings on 3220, supra note 16, at 49 (citing Dr. Allen Carter, Tax Relief and the
Burden of College Costs (1964)). In the first eight weeks of the 88th session of Congress, more than ninety bills relating to higher education tax relief were sent to
committee. Id.
38
Id. at 419 (question posed by Congressman Reid during statement of Hon.
Francis Keppel, Comm’r of Educ., and Peter Muirhead, Assoc. Comm’r for Higher
Educ.).
39
Id. at 48 (response made by Hon. Francis Keppel, Comm’r of Educ., during
statement of Hon. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare).
40
Id.
41
Higher Education Amendments of 1971: Hearings on H.R. 32, H.R. 5191, H.R. 5192,
H.R. 5193, and H.R. 7248 Before the Subcomm. on Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 92d Cong. 81 (1971) (opening remarks of Hon. Edith Green, chairman of the
special subcommittee).
42
GLADIEUX & HAUPTMAN, supra note 27, at 17.
43
ARTHUR M. HAUPTMAN & ROBERT H. KOFF, NEW WAYS OF PAYING FOR COLLEGE 36
(1991).
44
Id. at 18.
45
Id.
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both public and private institutions continued to outpace inflation
46
and the growth in median family incomes.
In the 1992 reauthorization of the HEA, Congress chose to address the needs of the middle class in two important ways. First, it
expanded borrowing opportunities by creating a new federally guar47
anteed unsubsidized student loan option and a parental loan option, both of which were available to all students (or their parents),
48
Second, it instituted a new federal
regardless of financial need.
formula for determining financial need under Title IV called the fed49
eral methodology (FM), which is still utilized today. The cornerstone of the FM is the calculation of the expected family contribution
(EFC). The EFC is the amount that the federal government expects a
family to contribute towards a student’s higher education expenses
before any need-based federal financial aid becomes available. Under the 1992 reauthorization, home equity and retirement accounts
were statutorily excluded as assets available to pay for college. As a
result of these changes, eligibility of middle-income families for Title
IV financial aid increased with no corresponding reduction in net
worth or standard of living. Consequently, the pool of students eligible for federal financial aid expanded with no commensurate increase in federal funding. As a result, financial aid per student fell
and the beneficiaries of need-based aid expanded into middle and
upper income range.
Still not satisfied with the level of middle-class college subsidies
50
and concerned with the overall tax burden on the middle class,
President William J. Clinton proposed and Congress enacted a package of new tax incentives for higher education in the Taxpayer Relief
51
Act of 1997 (TRA). Prior to 1997, outside of the employment con52
text, the tax benefits for higher education available to students
46

Id.
“Unsubsidized” in the sense that the federal government did not provide an inschool interest subsidy. GLADIEUX & HAUPTMAN, supra note 27, at 19.
48
Id.
49
Id; see also SANDY BAUM, COLLEGE BOARD, A PRIMER ON ECONOMICS FOR FINANCIAL
AID PROFESSIONALS 3 (2004), available at http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_down
loads/highered/fa/Economics-Primer-2004.pdf (noting that this was actually the
“second iteration of the congressional attempt to legislate a need analysis system, the
Congressional Methodology (CM) having been in effect from 1988 through 1992.”).
50
See Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 2014, as reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620-1 [hereinafter Statement by President Clinton].
51
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997).
52
Within the employment context, there is a deduction for employment-related
educational costs. I.R.C. § 162 (2000). This section applies if the education maintained or improved a skill required in the taxpayer’s current trade or business, if the
47
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and/or their parents were somewhat limited and included only: (1)
53
an exclusion for qualified scholarships; (2) a parental dependency
54
exemption for students aged nineteen to twenty-three; (3) an exclusion for interest earned on certain qualified savings bonds used to
55
pay qualified higher education costs; (4) relief from discharge of
56
indebtedness income on the forgiveness of certain student loans;
and (5) an exclusion for earnings on qualified state tuition pro57
grams. The new education-related tax provisions introduced by the
58
TRA included two tuition tax credits, a deduction for interest paid
59
on qualified educational loans, a new tax-favored savings vehicle for
60
higher education, and a provision allowing penalty-free withdrawals
from individual retirement accounts for payment of higher education
61
expenses. Subsequently, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Rec62
onciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) introduced a new deduction for
63
higher education expenses and expanded the tax benefits provided
by the student loan interest deduction and the higher education sav64
ings incentives. More recently, the Pension Protection Act of 2006
made certain of the temporary education-related savings incentives
65
passed under EGTRRA permanent.

education met the express requirement of taxpayer’s employer or an applicable law,
or was imposed as a condition of continued employment. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5
(1967). In addition, there is an exclusion for employer-provided educational assistance. I.R.C. § 127 (2000). See generally STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH
CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX BENEFITS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
(2004), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-52-04.pdf.
53
I.R.C. § 117 (2000).
54
Id. § 152(c)(3)(A)(ii).
55
Id. § 135.
56
Id. § 108(f).
57
Id. § 529.
58
Id. § 25A.
59
I.R.C. § 221.
60
Id. § 530.
61
Id. § 72 (t)(2)(E).
62
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10716, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
63
I.R.C. § 222 (2000 Supp. I).
64
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006).
65
Id. § 1304.
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According to President Clinton, the educational purpose of the
TRA higher education tax initiatives was to make “[two] years of college universally available and . . . make the third and fourth years of
college more affordable . . . [and] to help families save for higher
67
education.” It is interesting to note the formal introduction of affordability as a policy goal supporting these new non-need-based federal higher education tax initiatives. Prior to 1997, access was the sine
qua non of federal higher education policy, and the federal government pursued this policy goal through the need-based financial aid
programs under Title IV of the HEA.
B. Justification: Private and Public Benefits of Higher Education
Why is the federal government involved at all in higher education financing? There are both private and public benefits associated
68
with postsecondary educational attainment. College graduates earn
a high rate of return on their investment in the form of increased
69
lifetime earnings. Over the course of a forty-year career, a four-year
college graduate can expect to earn 73% more in wages than the av70
erage high school graduate. Even a community college graduate
realizes average lifetime earnings that are approximately 25% higher
71
than those of a high school graduate. The equality of opportunity
rationale first espoused by President Johnson also supports government subsidies for higher education for low-income students to ensure access to these increased earnings opportunities for those most
72
in need.
Indeed, advanced educational attainment may be one
73
means to reduce income inequality and poverty.
Not only does increased participation in higher education reward the individual student, but society as a whole reaps many re-

66

The TRA higher education tax incentives were designed not only to further
educational goals, but also to provide tax relief to the middle class. See Statement by
President Clinton, supra note 50; THOMAS J. KANE, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: RETHINKING
HOW
AMERICANS
PAY
FOR
COLLEGE
45
(1999),
available
at
http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815750137/html/index.html (arguing that these
provisions are tax relief not educational policy).
67
Statement by President Clinton, supra note 50.
68
EDUCATION PAYS 2004, supra note 4, at 7.
69
Id. at 9.
70
Id. at 11.
71
Id.
72
PAMELA J. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, HIGHER EDUCATION TAX CREDITS:
TEST AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 4 (2006), available at http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/
RL32507_20060117.pdf.
73
Id.
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74

wards from an educated citizenry. These societal benefits in excess
of private returns to higher education, or positive externalities, in75
76
77
clude lower levels of unemployment, poverty, and crime; in78
79
80
creased productivity; technological advancement; tax revenues;
81
82
civic participation; and reduced reliance on social safety nets. The
individual student may not factor these societal benefits in deciding
whether to attend college. As a result, absent a subsidy, under83
investment in higher education may occur. Accordingly, the goal of
government college subsidies is to stimulate private demand in order
84
to attain more optimal levels of education. According to a report by
the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, an independent committee created by Congress to advise on student aid policy, “[r]ecent estimates suggest that if the 32-percentage point gap in
the college-going rates of the highest and lowest income Americans
were narrowed significantly, we would add nearly $250 billion to the
85
gross domestic product and $80 billion in taxes.”
C. Prices, Aid, and Enrollment
The federal government uses financial subsidies as its policy instrument of choice to induce increased college attendance. This approach is supported by economic studies that illustrate the inverse relationship between cost and enrollment, although the magnitude of
this relationship varies. A well-known 1987 article by Larry Leslie and
Paul Brinkman reviewed and standardized the results of the existing
economic studies analyzing the effect of price increases on college
74

EDUCATION PAYS 2004, supra note 4, at 9.
Id. at 16 fig. 7 (noting that “[f]or all racial/ethnic groups, the unemployment
rate falls as education level increases.”).
76
Id. at 17. The poverty rate for college graduates is approximately one-third of
the poverty rate for high school graduates. Id.
77
Id. at 20. Incarceration rates decrease as education level increases. Id.
78
JACKSON, supra note 72, at 2.
79
MAAG & FITZPATRICK, supra note 24, at 8.
80
EDUCATION PAYS 2004, supra note 4, at 10. The average college graduate working full-time pays over 100% more in federal income taxes than the average high
school graduate. Id.
81
Id. at 23. In every age group, higher education levels correlate with higher voting rates. Id.
82
MAAG & FITZPATRICK, supra note 24, at 8.
83
Id.
84
JACKSON, supra note 72, at 2.
85
ADVISORY COMM. ON STUDENT FIN. ASSISTANCE, 107TH CONG., ACCESS DENIED:
RESTORING THE NATION’S COMMITMENT TO EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 2
(2001), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/acsfa/access_denied.
pdf [herinafter ACCESS DENIED].
75
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entry. The authors found that the mean response to a $100 increase
86
in tuition was a .7% drop in college enrollment. Thomas Kane converted the Leslie and Brinkman finding into a more standardized
format, translating their result as a 5% decrease in college enroll87
ment for every $1,000 increase in annual tuition costs. More recently, Susan Dynarski estimated that an increase of $1,000 in grant
aid, which equates to a $1,000 decrease in net price, increased the
88
probability of attending college by about 3.6%.
A contrary and controversial 1983 time series study by W.L. Hansen found that the availability of grant aid failed to increase access for
89
low-income students. In a later study in the early 1990s, Michael
McPherson and Morton Schapiro attempted to reconcile the discrep90
ancies in the student demand literature.
Using an econometric
analysis of time-series data, the authors demonstrated that “increases
in net cost over time lead to decreases in enrollment rates for lower91
An important companion finding was that inincome students.”
creases in net cost had no effect on the enrollment patterns of
92
wealthier students. A later study by Kane buttressed the McPherson
93
and Schapiro findings. Kane estimated that a $1,000 difference in
public two-year tuition resulted in a 4.5% decrease in enrollment,
while the same price reduction in public four-year tuition resulted in
94
only .8% decline in enrollment. Since low-income students are disproportionately represented in two-year public colleges, this finding
supported the conclusion that lower-income students are more sensitive to price in making the college enrollment decision than their
95
wealthier peers.

86

Leslie & Brinkman, supra note 22, at 188–89 (calculated in 1982–83 dollars).
KANE, supra note 66, at 114.
88
See generally Susan Dynarski, Does Aid Matter? Measuring the Effect of Student Aid on
College Attendance and Completion, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 279 (2003). Dynarski’s conclusion is based on an analysis of the effect that the elimination of the Social Security
student benefit program in 1982 had on college attendance. Id.
89
W.L. Hansen, Impact of Student Financial Aid on Access, in THE CRISIS IN HIGHER
EDUCATION 84–96 (Joseph Froomkin ed., 1983).
90
MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON & MORTON OWEN SCHAPIRO, THE STUDENT AID GAME:
MEETING NEED AND REWARDING TALENT IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (1998).
91
Id. at 39 (finding that a $150 net cost increase (in 1993-94 dollars) resulted in a
1.6% decrease in enrollment levels for students from families with incomes below
$20,000).
92
Id.
93
KANE, supra note 66, at 105.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 106 (“low-income” included the bottom 40% of the family incomes in the
study).
87
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Over the past decade, college tuition increases outpaced both
inflation and the growth in median family income. Tuition and fees
at public and private four-year colleges rose an average of 4.2% and
96
2.8% per year, respectively, in inflation-adjusted dollars. Even after
accounting for grant aid, average net prices at public and private
four-year colleges rose an average of 2.7% and 2.4% per year, respec97
tively, in inflation-adjusted dollars. While tuition and fees at public
four-year institutions grew in total by an inflation-adjusted 52% over
the past decade, median family income grew by only 3% during the
98
same time period.
Given the studies on the effect of price on enrollment, the increase in net tuition paid by college students over the past decade
should have caused enrollments to decline. Surprisingly, college en99
rollment rates actually increased during this period. In 1990, only
100
39% of the population entered college.
By 2000, over 50% of the
101
One
population pursued some form of postsecondary education.
reason for the failure of tuition increases to slow enrollment is the in102
creased financial returns associated with higher education.
These
enrollment increases and the associated earnings premiums, however, have not been shared equally among income groups. Lowincome students still lag behind their more affluent peers in postsecondary educational attainment. In 2003, 80% of students from families in the highest family income quintile, 65% of students from families in the second highest income quintile, and 61% of students from
103
In
families from the middle-income quintile enrolled in college.
contrast, only 49% of students from families in the two lowest income
104
quintiles combined enrolled in college.
96

COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 10 (2006), available at
http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/press/cost06/trends_college_prici
ng_06.pdf [hereinafter TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2006]. At public two-year colleges, the equivalent average increase in tuition and fees was 1.8% per year. Id.
97
Id. at 15–16. Net price is defined as the published price less the average grant
aid from all sources and the amount of any education tax benefits (education-related
credit or deduction only) per full-time student. Id. Interestingly, over the past decade, average net tuition and fees at public two-year colleges have declined by about
$600 in constant 2006 dollars. Id. at 17.
98
TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 23 (author’s own calculation in
constant 2005 dollars).
99
BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 3, at 3 fig. 2b.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
103
BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 3, at 8 (figures represent 2003 high school graduates
who enrolled in college immediately after high school).
104
Id.
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In combination, the student demand studies and the actual data
on enrollment suggest that to effectively increase college enrollment,
financial subsidies should be targeted to the most price-sensitive and
underrepresented socioeconomic group in higher education,
namely, lower-income students. Title IV of the HEA attempts, albeit
imperfectly, to target student financial aid in exactly this manner.
III. TITLE IV OF THE HEA
A. Description of Programs
The three-pronged approach under Title IV of the HEA to federal student aid (grants, loans and work-study) remains largely intact
today, although the composition has changed over time. During the
2004–2005 academic year, the federal government distributed ap105
proximately $83 billion in Title IV financial aid to college students.
The two largest programs under Title IV are the federal Pell grant
program and the federally guaranteed student loan programs.
106
The Pell grant program accounted for approximately $13 billion of the total Title IV financial aid distributed during the 2004–
107
2005 academic year. The Pell grant program is the largest federal
need-based grant program and the only pure subsidy under Title
108
IV. It is also the most progressive federal student aid program, with
84% of the funds distributed to dependent undergraduate students
109
with family incomes below $40,000. Individual grants for the 2004–
110
Although the
2005 academic year ranged from $400–$4,050.
maximum Pell grant award increased between academic years 2001–
2002 to 2005–2006, its purchasing power fell. During this period, the

105

TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 6 tbl. 1. This includes Title IV aid
to both undergraduate and graduate students. Id.
106
The Pell Grant was so named in honor of former Senator Claiborne Pell of
Rhode Island. TERRY W. HARTLE ET AL., AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., WHAT EVERY STUDENT
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT FEDERAL AID 7 (2005), http://www.acenet.edu/bookstore/
pdf/2005paying4college.pdf.
107
TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 6 tbl. 1 (in current 2005–2006
dollars).
108
This is in contrast to loans, which must be repaid, and work-study dollars,
which the student must work to earn.
109
LUTZ BERKNER ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 2003–04 NAT’L
POSTSECONDARY STUDENT AID STUDY (NPSAS:04) STUDENT FINANCIAL AID ESTIMATES
FOR 2003-04 (NCES 2005-158) 6 (2005), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005163.pdf
(hereinafter STUDENT FINANCIAL AID ESTIMATES).
110
TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 17 tbl. 8b.
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average cost of attendance at a public four-year institution covered by
111
a Pell grant declined from 42% to 33%.
Federally guaranteed student loans accounted for approximately
$63 billion of the total Title IV aid distributed during the 2004–2005
112
academic year. This total includes loans distributed on the basis of
113
demonstrated financial need, including Perkins and subsidized
114
Stafford loans, and loans available to all students regardless of
need, including unsubsidized Stafford and Parent Loans for Under115
graduate Students (“PLUS loans”).
Generally, federal student
loans enjoy a lower-than-market interest rate because of the federal
116
In addition, the government pays interest on needguarantee.
based loans while the student remains in college. Dynarski estimated
that the subsidy value of a subsidized Stafford loan was 30% of the
face amount of the loan while the subsidy value of an unsubsidized
117
Stafford loan was only 15% of the loan amount.
B. Federal Methodology
Student eligibility for the Pell grant and subsidized loan pro118
grams under Title IV is determined on the basis of financial need.
The statutorily prescribed formula under Title IV for determining
111

Id. at 17.
Id. at 6 tbl. 1.
113
Perkins loans are distributed through the financial aid offices of participating
colleges and universities. HARTLE ET AL., supra note 106, at 8.
114
Stafford loans are low-interest loans distributed directly to college students. Id.
at 9.
115
PLUS loans are distributed to the parents of dependent undergraduate students. Parental borrowers must have sufficiently good credit to qualify for a PLUS
loan. See Federal Student Aid, Plus Loans, http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALS
WebApp/students/english/parentloans.jsp?tab=funding (last visited Sept. 26, 2007).
116
The interest rate on Perkins loans is 5%. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1087dd(c)(1)(D)
(West 2006). For Stafford loans made after July 1, 1994 and prior to July 1, 2006, the
interest rate was a variable rate adjusted every July 1, with an interest rate cap of
8.25%. Id. §§ 1077a(f)–(k), 1087e(b)(1)–(7). For Stafford loans made on or after
July 1, 2006, the rate converts to a fixed 6.8%. Id. §§ 1077a(l)(1), 1087e(b)(7)(A).
For PLUS loans made after July 1, 1998 and before July 1, 2006, the interest rate was
a variable rate adjusted every July 1 with a 9% cap on interest. Id. §§ 1077a(k)(3),
1087e(b)(4). The interest rate on PLUS Loans disbursed on or after July 1, 2006
made under the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) Program is fixed
at 7.90%. Id. § 1087e(b)(7)(B). The interest rate on PLUS loans disbursed on or
after July 1, 2006 made under the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program is
fixed at 8.5%. Id. § 1077a(l)(2).
117
Susan Dynarski, Loans, Liquidity and Schooling Decisions 4–5 (Joint Ctr. for Poverty Research, Northwestern Univ./Univ. of Chicago Working Paper Series, JCPR
Working Paper No. 346, 2003), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~S
Dynarski/Dynarski_loans.pdf.
118
MCPHERSON & SCHAPIRO, supra note 90, at 11–12.
112
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119

need is called the federal methodology (FM).
This federal needs
analysis system can be reduced to a deceptively simple formula under
which need equals the cost of attendance (COA) less the expected
120
family contribution (EFC). COA includes an allowance for tuition,
121
EFC is the
fees, books, supplies, room, board, transportation, etc.
amount that the federal government expects a family to contribute
toward college costs before any federal financial assistance becomes
122
It attempts to measure a family’s ability to pay postsecavailable.
ondary education expenses out of the family’s own resources.
A few general observations about the FM should be made before
exploring the details. First, no student can qualify for financial aid in
excess of the total cost to attend a given institution. Second, a student whose EFC exceeds the COA at a given institution will have no
financial need and consequently will not qualify for any need-based
aid. Third, at any given COA, a family with a higher EFC will qualify
for less financial aid than a family with a lower EFC. Finally, at any
given EFC, a student applying to a more expensive school will demonstrate more need and consequently qualify for more financial aid
than a student applying to a less expensive school. Overall, the goal
of the FM is to distribute federal financial aid progressively based on
need.
There are three basic statutorily prescribed formulas used to calculate the EFC, depending on whether the student is a dependent
student, an independent student with no dependents other than a
123
spouse, or an independent student with non-spouse dependents. A
dependent student’s EFC is the sum of a parental contribution from
income and assets and a student contribution from income and as-

119

BAUM, supra note 49, at 3. This can be compared to the institutional methodology, which individual schools use to distribute non-federal financial aid to their
students. Id.
120
20 U.S.C. § 1087kk (2000).
121
Id. § 1087ll. The institutions provide this variable in the formula.
122
Id. § 1087mm.
123
Id. §§ 1087oo–1087qq. A student is independent for purposes of the federal
methodology if he or she: (1) is twenty-four years of age or older by December 31 of
the award year; (2) is an orphan or ward of the court or was a ward of the court until
age eighteen; (3) is a veteran of the U.S. armed forces; (4) is a graduate or professional student; (5) is married; (6) has legal dependents other than a spouse; or (7) is
designated as independent by a financial aid administrator. Id. § 1087vv(d). See also
2006–2007 FEDERAL STUDENT AID HANDBOOK, APPLICATION AND VERIFICATION GUIDE 22
[hereinafter FSA HANDBOOK], available at http://ifap.ed.gov/sfahandbooks/
attachments/0607AVG.pdf. As of 2006, those serving on active duty in the armed
forces are also treated as independent students. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-171, § 8019, 120 Stat. 4, 176 (2006).
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124

sets. The first step in calculating the parents’ contribution is to determine the parents’ income available to be put towards the child’s
125
education, or their “available income.” “Available income” is equal
to the parents’ “total income” less certain allowances including, inter
alia, an allowance for federal taxes and an income protection allow126
“Total income” is defined as the parents’ adjusted gross inance.
127
come (AGI) plus some items of untaxed income and benefits, mi128
nus some items of excludable income. In the 2006–2007 academic
year, the income protection allowance for a family of four with one
student in college protects up to $22,200 in after-tax income from as129
sessment under the FM.
A parental contribution from assets is then added to “available
130
income.”
For many middle-income families, however, the parental
asset contribution is increasingly irrelevant because home equity and
retirement accounts are excluded from consideration as assets avail131
Inable to be put towards a student’s higher education expenses.
cludable assets now are limited to cash accounts, the net worth of investments held outside of retirement plans, and the adjusted value of
132
farm and business assets. The value of includable parental assets is
offset by an asset protection allowance that varies by the age of the

124

20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(a)–(b) (2000).
Id. § 1087oo(b). This Article is focused mainly on dependent undergraduate
students. The plight of independent and graduate students is beyond the scope of
this paper.
126
Id. § 1087oo(c).
127
AGI is gross income (income from all sources per I.R.C. § 61 (2000)) less certain deductions allowed to all taxpayers regardless of whether they itemize or not.
See I.R.C. § 62 (2000).
128
20 U.S.C. § 1087vv(a)(1) (2000). Untaxed income and benefits include, inter
alia, (1) child support; (2) certain welfare benefits; (3) workman’s compensation; (4)
certain veterans’ benefits; (5) tax-exempt interest; (6) earned income tax credit; (7)
untaxed portion of pensions; and (8) payments to individual retirement accounts
and Keogh accounts excluded from income for Federal income tax purposes. Id. §
1087vv (b)(2000); see id. § 1087vv(e) (defining excludable income).
129
FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 56 tbl. A3 (providing updated inflationadjusted amounts).
130
20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(b)(1)(B) (2000).
131
KANE, supra note 66, at 23–24 (this includes pension, 401(k), and IRA account
balances).
132
20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(d)(2) (2000). The net worth of farm and business assets is
adjusted to protect a portion of these assets from assessment under the EFC formula.
See FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 56 tbl. A4 (providing updated inflationadjustment amounts). Under changes made by HERA 2005, the net worth of a family-owned and controlled small business is now excluded from consideration under
the EFC formula. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 8019, 120
Stat. 4, 176 (2006).
125
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older parent and the number of parents in the household.
In
2006, a two-parent household where the older parent is age forty-five,
could protect up to $44,300 in includable assets before any such as134
The value of includable assets
sets would be assessed by the FM.
over the asset protection allowance is multiplied by 12%, with the resulting sum representing the parents required contribution from
135
their assets.
The sum of the parents’ “available income” is added to their
contribution from assets to arrive at an intermediate sum called “ad136
justed available income.” The parental “adjusted available income”
is subjected to a progressive marginal rate schedule that ranges from
22% to 47% to arrive at the total parental contribution to the stu137
Stated another way, the financial aid system expects a
dent’s EFC.
dependent student’s parents annually to contribute a maximum of
47% of their total income and 5.64% of their includable assets over
the respective allowances towards their child’s postsecondary ex138
The parental contribution is further adjusted if there are
penses.
139
multiple children in college at the same time. Under these circumstances, the total parental contribution is divided by the number of
140
students in college.
The income and assets of the student are assessed by the FM in a
similar manner. However, the EFC formula expects the student to
contribute more of his or her own resources towards college than is
expected of the student’s parents. The student’s available income is
141
assessed at a flat rate of 50%. Furthermore, the student’s assets are
133

20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(d)(1)(B), (d)(3) (2000). The allowances for ages 40
through 65 are set to approximate the present cost of an annuity which, when combined with Social Security benefits, would provide at age sixty-five a moderate income
for a retired couple or single person. FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 39; see id. at
57 tbl. A5 (for updated asset protection allowance table).
134
Id. at 57 tbl. A5.
135
20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(d)(1)(C), (d)(4) (2000).
136
Id. § 1087oo(b)(1).
137
FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 57 tbl. 6. The maximum rate of 47% is
reached when the parents’ adjusted available income is $26,101 or more. Id.
138
The 5.64% is arrived at by multiplying 12% (the percentage of includable assets included in adjusted available income) by the maximum marginal rate on adjusted available income of 47%.
139
20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(b)(3) (2000).
140
Id.
141
Id. § 1087oo(g)(5). Available income of the student is total income less certain
allowances, including, inter alia, an allowance for federal income taxes and an income protection allowance. Id. § 1087oo(g)(1)(A)–(B), (g)(2). Prior to HERA
2005, the income protection allowance was $2,200 (indexed for inflation). Id. §
1087oo(g)(2)(D). HERA 2005 increased the student’s income protection allowance
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142

assessed at an annual flat rate of 35%. Under changes made by the
Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2005 (HERA 2005), beginning with the 2007–2008 academic year, the annual assessment rate
143
The total EFC is
for student-owned assets will be reduced to 20%.
the sum of the parental income and asset contribution and the stu144
dent income and asset contribution.
For certain lower-income families, there is a simplified EFC formula available that considers only the income and not the assets of
the family as resources available to be put towards paying college
costs. In 2006, a dependent student qualified for the simplified formula if two requirements were met: (1) neither the student nor the
parents were required to file an IRS Form 1040, except in order to
claim an education tax credit and (2) the parents’ combined AGI was
145
For the very poorest families where the parents’
less than $50,000.
AGI is $20,000 or less, an automatic zero EFC is assigned to the de146
pendent student.
The EFC is calculated by the U.S. Department of Education
(DOE) on the basis of financial and other information submitted by
the student on his or her Free Application for Federal Student Aid
147
(FAFSA).
To be eligible for any federal student aid (except parental PLUS loans), the student must have completed a FAFSA in the
to $3,000 in 2006. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, §
8017(a)(1)(A), 120 Stat. 4, 173–74 (2006).
142
20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(h) (2000). There is no asset protection allowance available
for the student. FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 40.
143
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 8017(a)(1)(B), 120 Stat.
4, 173–74 (2006).
144
20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(a) (2000).
145
FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 35. If the parents were not required to file a
tax return, income earned from work is substituted for AGI in determining whether
the student qualifies for the simplified formula. Id. Under HERA 2005, a student
may qualify for the simplified-needs EFC if, in addition to meeting the relevant income criteria, the student (or spouse), or the dependent student’s parent(s), received benefits from a means-tested Federal benefit program. Deficit Reduction Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 8018(a)(1)(A), 120 Stat. 4, 174 (2006). According to
the Department of Education, the receipt of a Federal means-tested benefit does not
make a student automatically eligible for the simplified needs test; it is simply an alternative to the tax return filing standard. Letter GEN-06-10 from James Manning,
Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Education, and Theresa S. Shaw, COO Fed.
Student Aid, to Colleagues (June 20, 2006), available at http://www.ifap.ed.gov
/dpcletters/GEN0610.html. The income criteria must also be met. Id.
146
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 8018(a)(2)(B), 120 Stat.
4, 174 (2006).
147
See Susan M. Dynarski & Judith E. Scott-Clayton, The Cost of Complexity in Federal
Student Aid: Lessons from Optimal Tax Theory and Behavioral Economics, 59 NAT’L TAX J.
319, 321–23 (2006) (describing the federal student aid application process in textual
and graphic formats).
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148

year preceding the intended award year.
A FAFSA or renewal
FAFSA must be filed anew each year in order to qualify for federal aid
for the next academic year. After receiving a completed FAFSA, the
DOE will process the information and send the student a Student Aid
149
The
Report (SAR), which contains the student’s calculated EFC.
DOE will also send the information contained in the SAR to those
colleges the student listed on his or her financial aid application
150
The colleges and universities will then use the EFC to conform.
struct a financial aid package consisting of federal, state and institu151
tional aid.
A prospective freshman cannot apply for federal financial aid until January of his or her last year in high school because
many of the FAFSA questions require financial information from the
152
This same potential college
immediately preceding calendar year.
student does not receive a financial aid package until March or April
153
Although some select colleges
of the senior year of high school.
and universities are committed to satisfying 100% of a student’s need
via financial aid, most schools leave a financial aid gap (difference between calculated financial need and the COA at a particular institu154
tion).
Susan Dynarski and Judith Scott-Clayton criticized the complex155
ity in this financial aid application process. Completing the FAFSA
156
is an extraordinarily complex and time consuming undertaking.
The FAFSA is longer in length and asks more questions than an IRS
157
Form 1040.
The goal of the FAFSA is to elicit sufficient information to create a precise financial snapshot of the family’s ability to pay
for college and concomitant need for aid. As argued by Dynarski and
Scott-Clayton, however, there is a trade-off between precision and
148

FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 3. The FAFSA is the only form that a student must complete for Title IV federal aid. However, the individual institutions may
require additional information for purposes of determining qualification for institutional aid. Id.
149
Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, supra note 147, at 322 fig. 1; see also FSA HANDBOOK,
supra note 123, at 6.
150
The report sent to the schools listed on the FAFSA is called the Institutional
Student Information Record. Id.
151
See HARTLE ET AL., supra note 106, at 11.
152
Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, supra note 147, at 323.
153
Id. (arguing that this may be too late to affect the college-going decisions of
students who are most sensitive to net price, or lower-income students).
154
HARTLE ET AL., supra note 106, at 6 (calling this the level of “unmet need”).
155
Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, supra note 147, at 319.
156
Id. at 323 tbl. 1 (comparing 2006–2007 FAFSA with IRS Forms 1040, 1040A,
and 1040 EZ).
157
Id. (although the official estimates of time to prepare are less for the FAFSA
than any of the tax forms).
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158

complexity.
Using optimal tax theory and behavioral economics,
the authors argue that provisions designed to more precisely target
aid to the neediest students create complexity and result in regressive
159
These compliance costs are disproportionately
compliance costs.
borne by exactly those lower-income families they are intended to
160
help. The study also demonstrated that although the costs of complexity were large, the benefits were small because much of the information elicited on the FAFSA failed to improve the targeting of
161
By using only parents’ AGI, marital status, family size, and the
aid.
number of children in college plus a few more variables, the authors
162
were able to capture 90% of the variation in Pell grant awards.
IV. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
The goal of Title IV remains increasing access to higher education by removing financial barriers thereto. The FM attempts to determine precisely the amount of unmet need faced by a student in attending the college of his or her choice. Need-based Title IV funds
are then distributed progressively, with the poorest students receiving
the largest amount of financial aid. The Title IV need-based aid system is quite effective from a distributional standpoint, with 84% of
the Pell grant funds awarded to families with incomes below
163
This distribution of college aid is the one most likely to
$40,000.
164
affect access.
The tax benefits for higher education, on the other hand, are
non-need-based higher education subsidies in the form of tax expen165
ditures rather than transfer payments.
“Tax expenditure,” as used
in this Article, refers only to those tax allowances that are specifically
enacted by Congress as subsidies to encourage taxpayers to engage in
a socially desirable activity. In other words, the tax system is simply
the mechanism through which the federal dollars are distributed with
158

Id. at 321.
Id. at 320.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. Dynarski and Scott-Clayton also argued that the time lag between filing the
FAFSA and actually receiving information about the amount and type of aid awarded
also potentially blunts the enrollment impact of Title IV aid. Id. at 320–21. The authors argue that providing financial aid information to the student in the spring of
the student’s final year in high school is too late for the subsidy to affect behavior.
Id.
163
BERKNER ET AL., supra note 109.
164
See supra Part II.C.
165
See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text (for listing of tax benefits for
higher education).
159
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regard to the particular activity. With regard to these types of tax expenditures, Congress alternatively could have enacted a direct spending program or expanded an existing spending program to induce
participation in the desired activity. Viewed in this light, the tax expenditures for higher education are college spending programs implemented through the tax system. However, there are equity, efficiency and complexity implications to placing these spending
programs in the tax system rather than distributing an equivalent
amount of federal higher education dollars through existing Title IV
spending programs.
In 2005, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated that
the tax expenditures for higher education that assist students in paying for college would cost the federal government $8.6 billion, with
the total foregone revenue broken down by program as follows: (1)
Hope Scholarship Credit/Lifetime Learning Credit: $5.2 billion; (2)
deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses: $2.8 billion; (3)
exclusion of earnings on Coverdell education savings accounts: $.1
billion; and (4) exclusion of earnings on qualified tuition programs:
166
These tax benefits for higher education are becoming
$.5 billion.
an increasingly important piece of the federal student aid puzzle.
The education tax credits and the deduction for qualified tuition and
related expenses alone accounted for 6% of the total federal student
167
The following section will briefly deaid distributed in 2005–2006.
scribe these various tax programs.

166

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2005–2009, at 35 (Comm. Print 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-1-05.pdf. The Joint Committee on Taxation is required
by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to calculate the
subsidy value of various tax expenditures, defined as the amount of foregone governmental tax revenue, as a tool for the government to use “in determining the relative merits of achieving specified public goals through tax benefits or direct outlays.”
Id. at 2. This Article is only concerned with those tax benefits for higher education
that are available to dependent undergraduate students to assist in paying their college expenses at the time of enrollment and that intersect with the needs analysis system under Title IV. Accordingly, the deduction for student loan interest was purposely omitted. See I.R.C. § 221 (2000). The interest subsidy associated with this tax
deduction is generally not realized until the student matriculates and begins repaying college loans.
167
TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 5.
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A. Description of Programs
1.

Hope Scholarship Credit

The Hope Scholarship Credit (Hope credit) is a nonrefundable
income tax credit for qualified tuition and related expenses paid dur168
ing the taxable year.
Qualified tuition and related expenses include tuition and fees only, not room and board or other college
169
costs.
Qualified expenses must be reduced by the amount of any
170
The Hope
qualified scholarship, including a Pell grant award.
credit is available on a per student basis and only during the first two
171
years of the student’s postsecondary education.
The credit can
cover the qualified expenses of the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse or
172
any dependent claimed by the taxpayer.
The maximum credit
amount is $1,500 and is calculated as the sum of 100% of the first
$1,000 in qualified expenses of the student and 50% of the next
173
$1,000 in qualified expenses. The Hope credit is phased out ratably
174
175
for taxpayers with an inflation-adjusted modified AGI between
$40,000 and $50,000 ($80,000 and $100,000 in the case of a joint re176
turn).
2.

Lifetime Learning Credit

The Lifetime Learning Credit (LLC) is a per-taxpayer, nonrefundable credit against income tax for the qualified tuition and re177
lated expenses paid by the taxpayer. The maximum credit amount
is $2,000, calculated as an amount equal to 20% of up to $10,000 in
178
qualified tuition and related expenses. Unlike the Hope credit, the

168

“Nonrefundable” means that the taxpayer can only claim the credit to the extent of his or her positive income tax liability. See infra notes 232–36 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the equity implications of this form of tax credit).
169
I.R.C. § 25A(f)(1)(A) (2000).
170
Id. § 25A(g)(2)(A).
171
Id. § 25A(b)(1), (b)(2)(C). The student must be enrolled on at least a halftime basis and must not have been convicted of a felony drug offense relating to the
possession or distribution of a controlled substance. Id. § 25A(b)(2)(B), (b)(2)(D).
172
Id. § 25A(f)(1)(a)(i)–(iii).
173
Id. § 25A(b)(1). This maximum credit is adjusted for inflation for all taxable
years beginning after 2001. Id. § 25A(h)(1).
174
Id. § 25A(h)(2).
175
I.R.C. § 25A(d)(3).
176
Id. § 25A(d); see also BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION
OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 37.2.3 (2005).
177
I.R.C. § 25A(c) (2000).
178
Id. § 25A(c)(1).

RYAN_FINAL

24

1/7/2008 3:39:07 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1
179

LLC can be claimed during any year of postsecondary schooling.
The AGI limits for the LLC are the same as those for the Hope
180
In addition, the LLC uses the same definition of qualified
credit.
181
expenses as the Hope credit.
However, the qualified expenses of
any student for whom the Hope credit is claimed cannot be taken
into account for purposes of the LLC, even if those expenses exceed
182
In effect, a taxpayer must
the maximum Hope credit amount.
choose on a per-student basis between claiming the LLC or Hope
credit.
3.

Deduction for Tuition and Related Expenses

EGTRRA enacted an alternative to either of the educational
credits in the form of a deduction for the qualified tuition and re183
lated expenses paid by the taxpayer during the year.
The deduction is allowable in computing AGI, making it available to all taxpay184
This deduction was
ers whether they itemize deductions or not.
enacted as a temporary measure; as such it was scheduled to expire in
185
2005. However, Congress extended the deduction through 2007.
186
The maximum deduction amount is $4,000 if the taxpayer’s AGI
does not exceed $65,000 ($130,000 in the case of a joint return); or
$2,000, if the taxpayer’s AGI does not exceed $80,000 ($160,000 in
187
the case of a joint return); or zero in all other cases.
4.

Qualified Tuition Programs

Qualified tuition programs are authorized by section 529 of the
Internal Revenue Code and are colloquially referred to as “529
plans.” A 529 plan is a college savings program established by a state
or an eligible educational institution. There are two types of 529
plans: (1) prepaid tuition (prepaid 529 plans) and (2) college savings
(college savings 529 plans). States are authorized to offer both types
179

The LLC is also available if the student is enrolled on less than a half-time basis. See id. § 25A(c).
180
Id. § 25A(d).
181
Id. § 25A(c)(2)(B).
182
Id. § 25A(c)(2)(A).
183
I.R.C. § 222(a), (c)(2)(A) (2000 Supp. I). Qualified tuition and related expenses are defined the same as for the education credits, including the reduction in
the amount of qualified expenses to account for the receipt of any Pell grant award.
Id. § 222(d)(1).
184
See I.R.C. § 62(a)(18) (2000 Supp. I).
185
Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat.
2922 (2006).
186
AGI as defined in I.R.C. § 222(b)(2)(C) (2000 Supp. I).
187
Id. § 222(b)(2)(B).

RYAN_FINAL

2008]

1/7/2008 3:39:07 PM

ACCESS ASSURED

25

of 529 plans. However, eligible institutions may only offer prepaid
529 plans. Currently, nineteen states (or institutions) offer prepaid
188
529 plans, whereas all fifty states offer college savings 529 plans.
A prepaid 529 plan allows a person to prepay the tuition of a
designated beneficiary by purchasing tuition credits or certificates in
advance of such beneficiary’s enrollment in college. These certificates or credits are redeemed at the time the beneficiary attends college to purchase an amount of higher education credits equivalent to
the amount he or she would have purchased in the original invest189
The purpose of the prepayment is to lock in tuition at
ment year.
current rates, thereby hedging against future tuition inflation. The
sponsoring state or institution itself invests prepaid 529 plan contributions and uses the return to meet its current liabilities under the
190
program. A prepaid 529 plan operates similarly to a traditional defined benefit plan with the investment risk on the sponsoring state or
institution that the return on contributions will be insufficient to
191
cover tuition increases.
A college savings 529 plan allows a person to make contributions
to an account established for the purpose of meeting the qualified
higher education expenses of a designated beneficiary. The account
192
owner chooses to direct contributions into one of several different

188

See College Savings Plans Network, 529 Plan Comparison By State,
http://www.collegesavings.org/planComparisonState.aspx (last visited Dec. 18,
2006) (listing the types of prepaid 529 plans offered by each state).
189
Katherine Baird, The Political Economy of College Prepaid Tuition Plans, 29 REV. OF
HIGHER EDUC. 141, 142 (2006) (noting that “[i]n almost all states, accounts can also
be redeemed for the equivalent in-state tuition value should the beneficiary choose
to attend either a private or out-of-state institution.”).
190
Id.
191
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 494
(2004) (indicating that “prepaid tuition programs are a defined-benefit-style device,
pooling resources (the prepaid tuition payments from families concerned about increasing education costs), shifting the risk associated with such costs to the program,
and guaranteeing an output in the form of in-state tuition (whatever that might be
when a child is ready for higher education).”). Many states’ prepaid 529 plans are
operating at a loss because investment returns failed to keep pace with tuition increases. Baird, supra note 189, at 143. States responded by either closing the program to new participants, increasing the price of tuition credits available under the
plan, or by reducing the face value of previously purchased tuition credits. Id. For
those states that guaranteed their prepaid tuition plans, funding shortfalls are absorbed by the state legislature, and ultimately by the taxpayers of the state. Id.
192
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-1(c), 63 Fed. Reg. 45019 (Aug. 24, 1998) (defining “account owner” as “the person who . . . is entitled to select or change the designated beneficiary of an account, to designate any person other than the designated
beneficiary to whom funds may be paid from the account, or to receive distributions
from the account if no such other person is designated”).
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193

investment vehicles offered by the state, which are usually managed
194
College
by private investment firms or large financial institutions.
savings 529 plans operate similarly to defined contribution plans with
the investment risk on the designated beneficiary and his or her family that the return on contributions will be insufficient to cover tui195
tion increases.
Both types of 529 plans are required to accept only cash contributions, maintain a separate accounting for each beneficiary, and restrict the investment direction of the contributor or designated bene196
ficiary. Generally, there is no age or other limit on who may be an
eligible designated beneficiary. Although there are no per contributor or per student annual contribution limits on 529 plans, each state
or sponsoring institution must impose an overall account limit equal
to the amount reasonably necessary to provide for the qualified
197
higher education expenses of the designated beneficiary.
In most
states, control over a 529 plan, including the ability to make withdrawals or change designated beneficiaries, is vested in the account
198
owner. The account owner can be any person and need not be the
plan originator, contributor, or designated beneficiary.

193

See id. § 1.529-2(g). This is allowed despite the statutory prohibition against a
“contributor to, or a designated beneficiary under, such [qualified tuition] program .
. . directly or indirectly direct[ing] the investment of any contribution to the program (or any earnings thereon).” I.R.C. § 529(b)(4) (2000 Supp. I).
194
Michael A. Olivas, State College Savings and Prepaid Tuition Plans: A Reappraisal
and Review, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 475, 477 (2003). The author offers some illuminating insights into the decreased state presence in these plans largely run by private investment firms. See id. at 490–500. Cf. Mercer E. Bullard, The Visible Hand in GovernmentSponsored Financial Services: Why States Should Not Be Allowed to Offer 529 Plans, 74 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1265 (2006) (arguing against state sponsorship of 529 plans).
195
Zelinsky, supra note 191, at 495.
196
I.R.C. § 529(b)(2)–(4) (2000 Supp. I). A plan does not violate this requirement if the person who establishes the account is permitted to select among different
investment strategies chosen by the program. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-2(g), 63 Fed.
Reg. 45019 (Aug. 24, 1998).
197
I.R.C. § 529(b)(6) (2000 Supp. I). The state cumulative contribution limits
range from $235,000 to $344,000. See Compare 529 Plans by Maximum Contributions, http://www.savingforcollege.com/compare_529_plans/index.php?plan_ques
tion_idspercent5Bpercent5D=308&mode=Go&page=compare_plan_questions (last
visited Sept. 26, 2007).
198
See supra note 192.
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Generally, the 529 plan itself is exempt from taxation. Contributions to a 529 plan are not deductible; however, the amounts con200
tributed grow income tax-free until distributed.
For taxable years
201
after 2001, distributions from 529 plans applied towards the payment of the qualified higher educational expenses of the designated
202
beneficiary are excluded from gross income. Qualified higher education expenses include tuition, fees, books, supplies and equipment,
and in the case of a student enrolled on at least a half-time basis,
203
room and board. Non-qualified distributions (those used for some
purpose other than the payment of the higher education expenses of
the designated beneficiary) are taxable to the distributee as an annu204
ity. In addition to the regular income tax imposed on nonqualified
distributions, subject to certain exceptions, a 10% penalty tax is also
205
206
imposed.
Rollovers to another 529 plan or a change in designated beneficiary of an existing 529 plan are income-tax-free as long
207
as the new designated beneficiary is a member of the family of the
208
original designated beneficiary.
199

I.R.C. § 529(a) (2000). This was not always the case. Prior to the enactment of
§ 529 in 1996, there was continuing litigation regarding the exempt status of the
Michigan Educational Trust, the first state-sponsored prepaid plan. See, e.g., Michigan v. United States, 40 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 1994), rev’d, 802 F. Supp. 120 (W.D. Mich.
1992); see also Jeffrey S. Lehman, Social Irresponsibility, Actuarial Assumptions, and
Wealth Redistribution: Lessons About Public Policy from a Prepaid Tuition Program, 88
MICH. L. REV. 1035 (1990) (providing a detailed analysis of the original Michigan
Education Trust); Eric A. Lustig, supra note 21, at 244–53 (describing history of taxation of 529 plans prior to enactment of I.R.C. § 529).
200
I.R.C. § 529(c)(1) (2000).
201
Prior to the 2001 Act, distributions from 529 plans were generally taxable to
the beneficiary or contributor. See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 106TH CONGRESS—BLUE
BOOK 9–11 (Comm. Print 2001), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/
Documents.asp?section=8 (follow link to report). The Pension Protection Act of
2006 made permanent the EGTRRA changes to I.R.C. § 529, including the federal
tax exclusion for qualified distributions from a 529 plan. Pension Protection Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1304, 120 Stat. 780, 1109 (2006).
202
I.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(B) (2000 Supp. I).
203
Id. § 529(e)(3).
204
Id. § 529(c)(3) (cross-referencing annuity rules set forth in I.R.C. § 72).
205
Id. §§ 529(c)(6), 530(d)(4). The penalty tax is not imposed if a distribution is
(1) made on or after the death of a beneficiary; (2) attributable to the beneficiary’s
being disabled; (3) made on account of a scholarship, allowance, or payment that is
described in § 25A(g)(2); and (4) made on account of the beneficiary attending certain U.S. military academies. Id.
206
Rollovers can be to a plan for the same beneficiary or for a different beneficiary. Id. § 529(c)(3)(C)(i).
207
A member of the family includes a designated beneficiary’s spouse, child or
descendant of a child (or their spouse), sibling or step-sibling (or their spouse), parent or ancestor of parent (or their spouse), step parent, niece or nephew (or their
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In addition to the income tax benefits just described, certain
significant federal wealth transfer tax benefits attach to 529 plans.
Contributions to 529 plans are considered completed gifts of present
209
interests.
Absent this provision, contributions to 529 plans would
be tested under the normal gift tax rules to determine whether the
gift was complete and whether it was of a present interest in prop210
Automatically treating all contributions as completed gifts of
erty.
present interests in property qualifies all contributions for the annual
211
gift tax exclusion. In 2006, this would allow a single donor to make
212
up to a $12,000 contribution to a 529 plan gift tax-free.
Additionally, a donor can elect to treat a single contribution as made ratably
over a five-year period, thereby allowing the contributor to front-load
213
In 2006, such
up to five years worth of gift tax annual exclusions.
an election would allow a contributor to make a single transfer of
$60,000 to a 529 plan without any federal wealth transfer tax im214
Distributions from 529 plans are not considered taxable
posed.
215
Rollovers or changes in designated beneficiaries are also exgifts.
empt from gift and generation-skipping transfer taxation, as long as
the new designated beneficiary is assigned to the same generation (or

spouse), aunt or uncle (or their spouse), son-in-law (or his spouse), daughter-in-law
(or her spouse), father-in-law (or his spouse), mother-in-law (or her spouse),
brother-in-law (or his spouse) or sister-in-law (or her spouse), or a first cousin. Id. §§
529(e)(2), 152(d)(2).
208
Id. § 529(c)(3)(C).
209
Id. § 529(c)(2)(A)(i).
210
See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2 (as amended in 1999) (explaining when a gift is
complete for purposes of the gift tax); Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b) (as amended in
1983) (defining present interest in property). A 529 plan contributor, with the
power, as account owner or otherwise, to withdraw a previously made contribution or
to change plan beneficiaries, would not receive completed gift treatment on the
original plan contribution. The existence of these powers would depend on the
plan itself. The inability of the 529 plan beneficiary to immediately use, possess, or
enjoy the contribution would defeat a finding of a present interest in property.
211
I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2000); see Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 2005-2 C.B. 974 (listing $12,000
as the inflation-adjusted annual exclusion amount under § 2503(b) for taxable year
2006).
212
See Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 2005-2 C.B. 974. In 2006, married couples that elected
gift-splitting could transfer up to $24,000 gift tax-free. I.R.C. § 2513 (2000).
213
I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)(B) (2000 Supp. I). In the event that the donor dies during
the five-year period following such a contribution, the gross estate of the donor includes the portions of the contributions allocable to periods after the death of the
donor. Id. § 529(c)(4)(C).
214
In 2006, married couples who elected gift-splitting and who chose to treat a
single contribution to a 529 plan as made ratably over a five-year period could transfer up to $120,000 gift tax-free. See supra notes 212–213.
215
I.R.C. § 529(c)(5)(A) (2000 Supp. I).
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216

higher) as the old beneficiary. Subject to certain exceptions, an interest in a 529 plan will not cause estate tax inclusion for any individ217
ual.
5.

Coverdell Education Savings Account

A Coverdell education savings account (Coverdell account) is “a
trust created or organized in the Unites States exclusively for the
purpose of paying the qualified education expenses” of the desig218
Until 2001, these tax-favored college savings
nated beneficiary.
219
Although similar in purplans were known as “Education IRAs.”
pose to a college savings 529 plan, Coverdell accounts are privately
administered rather than state or institution sponsored. The income
and transfer tax consequences for contributions to and distributions
from Coverdell accounts are similar to those of college savings 529
220
plans. In addition, both types of college savings plans enjoy similar
221
liberal rules regarding changes in beneficiary and plan rollovers.
Despite general similarity in tax treatment, Coverdell accounts
differ from 529 plans in several important ways. First, Coverdell accounts include elementary and secondary educational expenses as
222
Second, contributions to Coverdell accounts
qualified expenses.
must be made before the designated beneficiary’s eighteenth birth223
day and any balance in the account must be distributed within
thirty days of the beneficiary’s thirtieth birthday or, if the beneficiary
dies before attaining age thirty, must be distributed within thirty days
224
Third, annual account contributions are
after the date of death.
225
Fourth, unlike 529
limited in the aggregate to $2,000 per year.
216

Id. § 529(c)(5)(B).
Id. § 529(c)(4). This section indicates that the two exceptions to this rule are
for amounts distributed on account of the death of a beneficiary, and in the case of a
deceased donor who elected to treat a contribution as made ratably over a five–year
period, only the portion of such contribution properly allocable to periods after the
death of the donor. Id. Under normal estate tax rules, an account owner with the
ability to change beneficiaries or to cause account balances to be distributed to the
account owner would suffer estate tax inclusion of all or a portion of the college savings plans. See I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038, 2041 (2000).
218
I.R.C. § 530(b)(1) (2000 Supp. I).
219
See Act of July 26, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-22, § 1, 115 Stat. 196, 196–97 (officially
changing the name from “Education IRA” to “Coverdell education savings account”).
220
See I.R.C. § 530(d) (2000 Supp. I).
221
Id. § 530(d)(5)–(6).
222
Id. § 530(b)(2).
223
Id. § 530(b)(1)(A)(ii).
224
Id. § 530(b)(1)(E).
225
Id. § 530(b)(1)(A)(iii). This means that no accelerated gift tax annual exclusion option is necessary, and accordingly none is provided.
217
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plan contributors, Coverdell account contributors are subject to certain AGI limitations. The ability to make the maximum contribution
amount to a Coverdell account begins to phase out for an individual
226
with a modified AGI exceeding $95,000 ($190,000 in the case of a
joint return) and is completely phased out for an individual with an
227
AGI exceeding $110,000 ($220,000 in the case of a joint return).
B. Equity, Efficiency, and Complexity
Delivering these higher education subsidies through the tax system rather than through traditional student aid spending channels
has certain implications for the equity, efficiency, and complexity of
the federal financial aid system as a whole.
1.

Equity

The tax benefits for higher education in the form of a deduction
or an exclusion from income, including the deduction for higher
education expenses and the exclusion of earnings in tax-favored college savings plans, are regressive in the distribution of their benefits.
The value of the subsidy provided by these types of tax expenditures
228
increases as the taxpayer’s marginal rate bracket increases.
Furthermore, non-taxpayers are completely foreclosed from realizing any
higher education subsidy from the education-related deduction and
229
In 2004, 35% of taxpayers had no positive income tax
exclusions.
liability, and these same taxpayers housed almost half of all America’s
230
children.
One way to temper the regressivity of these types of tax expenditures is to impose AGI limits on who may claim the benefit. As described above, AGI limits are imposed on the education-related de-

226

“Modified” AGI means the AGI of the contributor increased by any amount
excluded from gross income under I.R.C. §§ 911, 931, or 933. Id. § 530(c)(2).
227
Id. § 530(c); see also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 176, at ¶ 16.8.
228
STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 71–72 (1985) (describing the upside-down nature of many tax subsidies). The subsidy value of a deduction or exclusion from income is equal to the amount of deduction or exclusion
multiplied by the taxpayer’s marginal income tax rate.
229
Id. at 72.
230
Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax
Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 28 (2006) (citing William G. Gale, Tax Bracket and Tax
Liabilities for Families with Children, 105 TAX NOTES 1145 (2004); Peter R. Orszag &
Matthew G. Hall, Nonfilers and Filers with Modest Tax Liabilities, 100 TAX NOTES 723
(2003); Scott A. Hodge, Number of Americans Outside the Income Tax System Continues to
Grow, FISCAL FACTS 27 (Tax Found., Washington, D.C.), June 9, 2005, available at
http:// www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/542.html).

RYAN_FINAL

2008]

1/7/2008 3:39:07 PM

ACCESS ASSURED

31
231

duction and credit claimants, and Coverdell account contributors.
Although this does not cure regressivity below the AGI limitation, it
does prevent high-income taxpayers from claiming the college tax
benefit. On the other hand, 529 plans impose no AGI limitations
and therefore allow the highest income taxpayers, those least in need
of federal financial assistance, to claim disproportionately large federal higher education subsidies.
Another way to mitigate the regressive distribution of tax expenditure benefits is to design the tax program as a credit against tax
232
rather than as a deduction or exclusion.
This is the approach of
the education-related tax credits. The amount of a Hope credit or a
LLC reduces the claimant’s income tax payable on a dollar-for-dollar
basis regardless of the family’s marginal rate bracket. However, since
neither education-related credit is refundable, the maximum credit is
233
limited by the amount of the taxpayer’s positive income tax liability.
In 2006, a married couple with two dependents who claimed only the
standard deduction and personal exemptions would not incur posi234
tive income tax liability until their gross income reached $23,500.
To claim the maximum LLC of $2,000, this same family would need
235
to report at least $41,850 in gross income. Both of these thresholds
would be pushed higher if the same family claimed the earned in236
come tax credit.
Accordingly, the poorest families cannot benefit
231

See supra notes 176, 180, 187, 227 and accompanying text. It is interesting to
note that the more regressive tax benefits for higher education (education-related
deductions and exclusions) enjoy higher AGI limitations than the less regressive tax
benefits (education credits).
232
SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 228, at 108.
233
See Bridget Terry Long, The Impact of Federal Tax Credits for Higher Education Expenses, in COLLEGE CHOICES: THE ECONOMICS OF WHERE TO GO, WHEN TO GO, AND HOW
TO PAY FOR IT 101, 115 (Caroline M. Hoxby ed., 2004) (using 1999 income tax return
data, Long’s study found that “half of the higher education tax credit beneficiaries
were not able to take the full credit for which they were otherwise eligible” because
of insufficient positive income tax liability).
234
Author’s calculation assuming that the family has no other deductions except
the standard deduction ($10,300 in 2006) and personal exemptions ($3,300 each).
See Internal Revenue Service 2006 Form 1040, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f1040.pdf?portlet=3.
235
Author’s calculation. The level of taxable income required to incur at least
$2,000 in taxes for 2006 is $18,350. See Internal Revenue Service 2006 1040A Instructions, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040a.pdf. To have $18,350 in taxable income after personal exemptions and credits requires at least $41,850 in gross income.
236
I.R.C. § 32 (2000). The earned income tax credit is a refundable tax credit
available to low-income working families. In 2007, married taxpayers filing jointly
with one qualifying child could claim a partial earned income tax credit if their AGI
was below $35,241. Rev. Proc. 2006-53, 2006-48 I.R.B. 996.
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from the education-related tax credits at all and lower-income families may see their educational credit amount limited by their otherwise minimal positive income tax liability.
The empirical data supports the hypothesis that the tax benefits
from the tuition deduction and the higher-education-related tax
credits are largely enjoyed by middle- and upper-middle-income taxpayers. In 2004, 35% of the tax savings from claiming an education
credit went to families with AGIs between $25,000 and $49,999; 31%
went to families with AGIs between $50,000 and $74,999; and 23%
237
went to families with AGIs between $75,000 and $99,999. Only 11%
of the tax savings from the education-related credits went to families
238
with AGI below $25,000. The data on the higher education deduc239
Thirtytion claimants is skewed even further up the income scale.
six percent of the tax benefit from the tuition tax deduction was
claimed by families with AGIs between $50,000 and $99,999, and 41%
240
was claimed by families with AGIs between $100,000 and $160,000.
Although no tax return data is available with regard to the tax
savings associated with the education-related savings accounts, the regressive distribution of tax benefits combined with the relatively
higher AGI limit for Coverdell account contributors and the lack of
an AGI limitation for 529 plan contributors suggests that the subsidies associated with contributions to college savings plans are enjoyed
241
by those families on the highest end of the income scale.
Using a
2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, Dynarski estimated that the median income of households holding a tax-favored college savings account was $91,000, which was $41,000 higher than the median in242
come for all households with children under the age of sixteen.
An additional distributional problem, unique to tax-favored college savings plans, is introduced by the fact that families cannot realize any tax benefit until they actually make a plan contribution from
their own funds. Lower-income families may lack available after-tax
disposable income to contribute to a 529 plan or Coverdell account.
Even for a lower-income family with available funds, a 529 plan or
237

TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 25 fig. 16.
Id.
239
This is a result of the higher AGI limit imposed on taxpayers claiming the tuition deduction. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
240
TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 25 fig. 17.
241
Since there is no deduction for contributions to tax-favored college savings
plans, there is nothing for a plan contributor to report on his or her tax return. In
addition, the exclusion from income associated with college savings plans is also not
reported on a tax return.
242
Dynarski, Who Benefits, supra note 25, at 364 tbl. 1.
238
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Coverdell account may not be a wise investment. The small tax benefit realized may be far outweighed by the risks involved in committing
243
Recall that
funds to a tax-favored college savings plan or account.
non-qualifying plan or account distributions incur a regular income
tax and a 10% penalty tax. For lower-income families, the risk that
non-qualifying distributions will be made is higher than for other
families because there is a greater risk that the designated beneficiary
will not attend college or that the college savings funds will be
244
For the highestneeded for other current consumption purposes.
income taxpayers, the large tax savings that can be realized by saving
in a 529 plan or Coverdell account may outweigh the very small risks
of nonattendance or needing the funds for non-qualifying purposes.
The additional federal wealth transfer tax advantages afforded
529 plans and Coverdell accounts also skew the benefits of these
plans in favor of high-income taxpayers. Lower- and middle-income
taxpayers are simply not subject to these taxes and derive no benefit
245
Even when a non-qualified disfrom any transfer tax expenditure.
tribution is made, there is no recapture of any federal wealth transfer
tax benefits previously provided to the contributor. Compare this to
the income tax treatment of non-qualifying distributions. In the case
of a non-qualifying distribution from a tax-favored college savings account, an income tax and a penalty tax attach. Presumably, since the
income tax exemption is justified as a way of encouraging families to
save for college, when that assumption turns out to be false, the exemption no longer applies. However, the treatment of the initial
transfer as a completed gift of a present interest when it would not
otherwise have been is not recast upon a non-qualifying distribution.
In addition, the contributor can continue to exert control over the
beneficial enjoyment of the property as account owner, with no fear
of estate tax inclusion, even if the funds are not used to pay college
246
Depending on the contributor, these transfer tax beneexpenses.
243

As described above, the subsidy value of an exclusion from gross income is directly tied to the taxpayer’s marginal rate bracket. The amount of tax saved by excluding an item of income is equal to the amount of the exclusion multiplied by the
taxpayer’s marginal income tax rate.
244
See supra note 5 (detailing the enrollment gaps between the lowest income
quintiles and the highest).
245
Currently, the gift tax is not imposed until taxable gifts exceed one million dollars and the estate tax is not imposed until the taxable estate exceeds two million dollars. I.R.C. §§ 2010(c), 2505(a)(1) (2000 Supp. I). Married couples can effectively
double these taxable limits.
246
See supra notes 210, 217 (discussing the normal transfer tax rules that would be
applicable to a contributor to or account owner of a tax-favored college savings
plan).
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fits may overcome the income and penalty taxes imposed and make
investing in a tax-favored college savings plan a winning proposition
no matter how the designated beneficiary ultimately uses the funds.
The higher education tax expenditures mainly benefit middleand upper-income taxpayers with little or no subsidy provided to lowincome taxpayers. This distribution pattern works at cross purposes
with progressive goals of Title IV and introduces an unsavory amount
of regressivity into the overall distribution of federal higher education dollars. However, one could argue that the college tax subsidies
temper the impact of the high marginal implicit tax rates that families face under the EFC formula in the Title IV needs analysis. The
process of calculating the EFC by assessing the income and assets of a
family at statutorily prescribed rates has been criticized as a system of
247
For
implicit taxation that reduces incentives to work and to save.
those families subject to the FM, every additional dollar of income or
248
increase in includable asset value results in a proportionate decrease in eligibility for Title IV need-based aid. Under this line of
analysis, the annual maximum implicit tax rate under the FM on pa249
However,
rental income is 47% and on parental assets is 5.64%.
the assessment process under the FM is an annual one, resulting in a
cumulative parental asset implicit taxation rate over a four-year pe250
Similarly, the implicit annual tax rates on student inriod of 21%.
251
Cumulatively, the
come and assets are 50% and 35%, respectively.
FM implicitly taxes student assets at a rate of 82% over a four-year col252
lege career.
There are multiple responses to this argument. First, these implicit tax rates may be overstated because they assume that financial
aid is an entitlement that covers 100% of a student’s need as calcu253
lated under the FM.
In fact, except at certain elite institutions, fi254
Second, although econancial aid covers less than 100% of need.
nomic theory suggests a potential disincentive to work and to save as
247

See, e.g., Dick & Edlin, supra note 23, at 295–322; Martin Feldstein, College Scholarship Rules and Private Savings, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 552, 552–66 (1995).
248
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
249
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
250
Dynarski, Who Benefits, supra note 25, at 378 (using formula [=1-(1-.0564)4]).
251
See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text. Note that this does not take
into account the reduction in asset rate applied to student assets under HERA.
252
Dynarski, Who Benefits, supra note 25, at 378.
253
Dick & Edlin, supra note 23, at 296–97, 319 (finding that financial aid implicit
tax rates are smaller than those suggested in earlier studies because the earlier studies assumed that aid equals need under the FM while their study used empirical data
on actual aid awards to calculate financial aid awards).
254
Id. at 297.
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a result of implicit taxation under Title IV, empirical evidence is
255
needed to prove that the FM actually affects work and savings.
Even critics admit that the extent to which parents understand these
256
incentives and act accordingly remains unclear.
Therefore, the
need for mitigation through tax subsidies is overstated.
Third, the marginal implicit tax rates under the FM apply only to
those families who are potentially eligible for financial aid. Two types
of families on opposite ends of the income spectrum are entirely ex257
empt from implicit taxation under the aid system.
The lowest income families will qualify for the maximum amount of Title IV needbased aid regardless of marginal changes in income or wealth. The
very highest income families will never qualify for Title IV need-based
258
Hence,
aid regardless of marginal changes in income or wealth.
any college tax subsidy that benefits these two categories of families
cannot be justified on the basis of its ameliorating effect on implicit
marginal tax rates under the FM. While the poorest families realize
no tax benefit from the higher education tax expenditures, the
wealthiest families enjoy the largest subsidies associated with the tax259
favored college savings plans.
The final response to the argument that college tax benefits are
necessary to mitigate the effects of high implicit tax rates under the
FM relates to the fact that middle-income families have been receiving relief from implicit tax rates on assets under the FM since 1992,
when home equity and retirement accounts were excluded from implicit taxation. This lowered the overall effective implicit marginal
tax rate on assets under the EFC formula. Accordingly, it is questionable whether additional relief through a tax subsidy is necessary.
255

See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 546–52 (1994) (offering a similar critique of
the claim by critics of the earned income tax credit that the credit creates disincentives to work over its phase-out range).
256
Dick & Edlin, supra note 23, at 319. A lack of understanding of the EFC formula results from its complexity and the fact that the financial aid applicant does not
actually calculate the EFC; the Department of Education does. See supra notes 147–
54 and accompanying text. However, familiarity with the EFC formula and its disincentive effects may be increasing with the advent of websites that contain EFC calculators and that detail financial aid maximization strategies. See, e.g., FinAid!,
http://www.finaid.org/; Financial Aid—Petersons, http://www.petersons.com/fin
aid/file.asp?id=780&path=ug.pfs.financial (last visited Dec. 14, 2006).
257
Dynarski, Who Benefits, supra note 25, at 376.
258
For both sets of families, the implicit tax rate on an additional dollar of income
or asset value is zero. Id. at 376–77.
259
This is a result of the relatively high AGI limitations that apply to Coverdell account contributors and the lack of an AGI limitation applicable to 529 plan contributors. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.

RYAN_FINAL

1/7/2008 3:39:07 PM

36

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

The asset exclusions also created inequities in the distribution of
Title IV need-based benefits. Consider two families with equal
amounts of income and wealth. On a pure ability-to-pay basis, each
family should qualify for the same amount of need-based federal financial aid. However, the composition of their asset holdings may
change the predicted outcome. The family that holds most of their
wealth in the form of home equity and retirement accounts will qualify for more need-based aid than the family with a different asset mix.
This violates notions of horizontal equity. Consider also the case of
two families of unequal wealth who both qualify for the same amount
of federal need-based financial aid because the wealthier family holds
a portion of their wealth in the form of home equity and retirement
plans. In this case, vertical equity is violated. The preference in the
aid system for home ownership and retirement accounts is in addition to the already generous treatment of these assets by the federal
260
income taxation system.
2.

Efficiency

One can measure efficiency in a number of different ways. This
Part is concerned only with one type of efficiency, namely, the ability
of the tax expenditures for higher education to achieve their stated
public policy goals of increased college access, affordability, and sav261
ings.
a.

Access

The tax benefits for higher education can only increase access to
college if the financial subsidy induces students who would not otherwise attend college to enroll. Otherwise, the government is subsidizing an activity that would have occurred anyway absent the subsidy.
The economic studies cited in Part II.C suggest that lower-income potential college students are the most sensitive to price in making the
enrollment decision. In addition, lower-income students are the
most underrepresented population, by family income level, of college
262
attendees. Accordingly, to expand access to higher education, and
to make it more equally available across income classes, federal subsi-

260

See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 121, 163 (2000) (for income tax benefits available to homeowners); id. §§ 401, 403, 408, 408A (for income tax benefits available to retirement
savers).
261
Statement by President Clinton, supra note 50.
262
A 32% gap remains between the college participation rates of families earning
below $25,000 per year and families earnings above $75,000 per year. See ACCESS
DENIED, supra note 85.
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dies should be aimed at lower-income students. As previously described, the tax benefits for higher education provide little or no
benefit to lower-income students. This suggests that they will have little effect on college enrollment levels. Available empirical data on
the education-related credits support this conclusion. Bridget Terry
Long studied the impact of the educational credits on college access
three years after enactment and found no enrollment response after
263
the introduction of the credits.
The study’s lack of an enrollment response from the college tax
credits can be partially explained by a lack of knowledge about the
264
existence of the tax credits at the time of the study. Even those taxpayers who are aware of the education tax credits do not always claim
265
the credit for which they are eligible.
Furthermore, the distributional impact of the college tax credits favors middle-income taxpay266
ers, who would have attended college with or without the subsidy.
In addition, the timing of the delivery of the tax credits may further
explain why these provisions failed to induce increased college en267
Simply put, the tuition subsidy may come too late to afrollment.
fect access. In most cases, a family that pays its tuition bill in August
will not realize the federal subsidy until it files a tax return in the year
following the year of payment. In other words, the tax credit amount
reimburses the claimant for tuition payments already made. Title IV
aid, on the other hand, offsets current tuition bills. For families lacking the liquidity to pay their tuition charges as they fall due, the existence of a future tax credit may have no effect on their current enrollment decision. Even for those families who can afford to make
the tuition payment, the subsidy is delivered after the enrollment decision was already made.
263

Long, supra note 233, at 137.
Id. at 122 (finding that only one-third of the parents asked in a 1999 National
Household Education Survey (NHES) had heard of one of the education tax credits,
and only 21.5% and 18.7% had heard of the Hope scholarship credit and LLC, respectively).
265
A recent study suggests that 74% of eligible students used the Hope credit and
63% used the LLC. Burman et al., supra note 25, at 15. The authors note that “participation tends to rise with income, raising the concern that those most in need are
least likely to participate, even when eligible.” Id. The authors speculate that lowincome families’ lower take-up rate is attributable to a lack of knowledge of the existence of the credits combined with the minimal or nonexistent benefit available
when positive income tax liability is limited or lacking. Id. at 15-16.
266
See supra notes 232–40 and accompanying text (describing distributional effects
of education-related tax credits); see also Burman et al., supra note 25, at 14.
267
Long, supra note 233, at 103–04; see also JACKSON, supra note 72, at 16 (noting
that it is possible to mitigate the timing problem if taxpayers adjust their income tax
withholding so that their take-home pay is greater over the entire tax year).
264
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In reality, the timing of the tuition subsidy provided by the college tax credits may only be a problem during the first year of postsecondary education. When the bill for the second year arrives, the
increased wealth realized as a result of the tax credits or deduction
could be put towards the higher education expenses of that year.
However, a family could also spend their increased wealth on a vacation or another consumption-type expense. Accordingly, as noted by
Kane, the higher education credits and deduction will primarily produce an income effect on families with college students, rather than a
price effect, “as if the federal government were sending families a tax
268
refund unrelated to how much more they spend on college.”
The potential effect (or non-effect) on college access of the tuition tax deduction would be similar to that of the education credits
because it serves as an alternative to either of the tax credits. As for
529 plans and Coverdell accounts, if a family lacks the financial
wherewithal to save in the first place, there is no potential enrollment
response to be realized by the existence of these tax-favored savings
plans.
b.

Affordability

It is unclear whether the tax benefits for higher education make
college more affordable, especially if, as noted by Kane above, they
primarily produce an income rather than a price effect. To make college more affordable, the tax subsidies must reduce net price. If colleges and universities raise their tuitions in response to the existence
of additional federal funds, then students realize no net price de269
Under this scenario, the tax benefits serve as an indirect
crease.
subsidy to colleges and universities. When the education-related tax
credits were introduced, many states reacted by explicitly considering
270
Long
ways to capture the new federal higher education dollars.
studied the possible effects of the introduction of the education credits on college pricing and found “some evidence to support that public two-year colleges responded to incentives created by the tax credits
by raising tuition price beyond what can be explained by fluctuations
in state support, and the responses were stronger for schools with a

268

KANE, supra note 66, at 45.
Note also that if schools reduce their own need-based aid in response to the
existence of the college tax subsidies, a similar result would follow.
270
Long, supra note 233, at 144–145 (describing how California, Arkansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Washington, and New York all considered raising in-state tuition at public colleges to capture the additional federal aid).
269
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greater proportion of credit-eligible students.”
This institutional
response has a particularly harsh effect on low-income students who
are disproportionately represented at public two-year colleges, and
who face increased tuition as a result of the existence of the college
tax credits without the ability to claim their benefits because of
272
minimal positive income tax liability.
The higher education tax expenditures will also not affect affordability if the existence of the additional subsidy induces students
to attend more expensive colleges. The structure of the educationrelated tax credits encourages students to attend more expensive colleges, especially the LLC credit, where the maximum amount cannot
273
be obtained until the student incurs $10,000 in tuition expenses.
The existence of a large balance in a tax-favored college savings plan
may also induce a student to attend a more expensive college in order to minimize the possibility of paying the taxes associated with
non-qualifying distributions of excess unused plan funds upon ma274
Affordability will also not be enhanced to the extent
triculation.
that a portion of the tax savings associated with a college savings plan
is lost to financial intermediaries in the form of commissions and
275
This is especially true with regard to state sponsored 529
fees.
plans, which are usually managed by private investment firms or large
276
financial institutions.

271

Id. at 161.
TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 22 (chart entitled “Income Distribution of Families within Public Two-Year and Four-Year Institutions, 2003–4004”
shows that while 31% of families in the lowest income quartile attended a public twoyear institution only 18% of families in the top income quartile attended public twoyear institutions).
273
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
274
The liberal beneficiary change and rollover rules for the tax-favored college
savings plans could mitigate this possibility, which, in turn, would mitigate the incentive effect to maximize the use of the funds for any one beneficiary’s higher education expenses. See supra notes 206–08, 221 and accompanying text.
275
See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 228, at 84. On the issue of 529 plan fees,
see LINDA L. LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, SAVING FOR COLLEGE THROUGH
QUALIFIED TUITION (SECTION 529) PROGRAMS 5–8 (2004) (chronicling the history of
Congress’s investigation into the fees charged by various plans and the regulatory
oversight of such plans, including a discussion of whether 529 plans are subject to
the federal securities laws regarding financial information disclosure). Reportedly,
expenses and fees in 529 plans are higher than in other types of savings vehicles. Id.
at 5.
276
Olivas, supra note 194, at 490–500 (offering illuminating insights into the decreased state presence in these plans largely run by private investment firms). In
2003, approximately two-thirds of college savings 529 plans were sold through financial intermediaries. LEVINE, supra note 275 at 6.
272
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The amount of tax assistance available to a family with a student
in college depends not only on the level of higher education expenses incurred by the family, but also on the family’s overall tax
277
situation for the year.
This may impede the ability of the higher
education tax benefits to make college more affordable in any given
year. For example, if Congress lowers income tax rates, or the family’s income suddenly drops them into a lower tax bracket, the tax
benefits available to the family may be limited for that year. For example, between 2001 and 2002, participation in the education tax
278
This may be attributable to the overall
credit programs decreased.
279
income tax rate reduction enacted under EGTRRA.
c.

Savings

According to the JCT, in enacting the tax-favored college savings
plans, Congress wanted “to encourage families and students to save
280
for future education expenses.” It is unclear whether 529 plans and
Coverdell accounts have induced new college savings or have simply
allowed wealthy individuals to shift existing non-tax advantaged college savings into these new vehicles. In 2001, Dynarski profiled
Coverdell and 529 investors as those with “incomes, education and
wealth that are higher than those of both retirement savers and the
281
general population.” These characteristics suggested that the families who are taking advantage of the college savings incentives are
those who probably would have saved for higher education anyway
282
What the study did not show was whether the
absent the subsidy.
dollars invested in the college savings plans were new savings dollars,
277

See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 228, at 103–04.
JACKSON, supra note 72, at 8. “Participation” as used in the text includes a decrease in the number and amount of credits claimed. Id. at 8 tbl. 1.
279
Id.
280
STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997—BLUE BOOK, at 27 (1997), available at http://waysand
means.house.gov/Documents.asp?section=8 (follow link to report) [hereinafter TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997].
281
Dynarski, Who Benefits, supra note 25, at 365. Dynarski admitted to the deficiencies in using a 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, as the data set predated the
expansion of tax benefits of college savings plans under the 2001 Act. Id. at 363. In
concluding, Dynarski stated “college savers may become more similar to the typical
household with children, and to other savers, as the programs widen in popularity.”
Id. at 365. Since 2001, the amount of funds in state-sponsored 529 plans has ballooned from $2.5 million to $8.5 million. TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2,
at 24 fig. 15. Accordingly, the education saver profile might look quite different today.
282
Dynarski, Who Benefits, supra note 25, at 365; see also Burman et al., supra note
25, at 16 (making a similar observation).
278
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or existing savings dollars merely shifted into the new tax- advantaged
283
In the latter case, no increase in overall savings would
accounts.
result.
3.

Complexity

The addition of these tax expenditures for higher education
284
adds complexity to an already complex federal student aid system.
Complexity potentially limits the effectiveness of the tax benefits as
vehicles through which higher education subsidies may be delivered
to their intended beneficiaries.
Initially, lack of knowledge of the existence of the various education-related tax benefits slowed expected participation rates. For example, the actual revenue loss to the federal government from 1998–
2002 associated with the education-related tax credits was 30% less
285
Even if taxpayers knew about
than the JCT originally estimated.
some of the education related tax provisions, they may not have
known about all of them. Although there are five tax expenditures
for higher education described above, many more exist, including,
286
inter alia, the exclusion for scholarship income, the parental ex287
emption for students aged eighteen to twenty-three, penalty-free
288
289
withdrawals from IRAs, student loan interest deduction, and the
290
exclusion of interest on qualifying educational bonds.
Even if a family knows about the various tax benefits for higher
education, determining eligibility is a difficult task. Each college tax
benefit may differ in AGI limitations and phase-out ranges, definition
of qualifying expenses, and annual contribution limits. In addition,
some of the tax benefits apply on a per student basis and some tax
291
benefits may apply on a per taxpayer basis.
Once eligibility for the various programs is determined, the issue
292
of choice complexity arises.
Choosing among the programs for
283

See Dynarski, Who Benefits, supra note 25, at 365 n.10.
See discussion supra Part III.B about complexity in the financial aid needs
analysis system.
285
JACKSON, supra note 72, at 8.
286
I.R.C. § 117 (2000).
287
Id. § 152(c)(3)(A)(ii).
288
Id. § 72(t)(2)(E), (t)(7).
289
Id. § 221.
290
Id. § 135.
291
For example, the Hope credit is a per student credit while the LLC is a per
taxpayer credit. Compare I.R.C. § 25A(b)(1) (Hope), with I.R.C. § 25A (c)(1) (LLC).
292
The term “choice complexity” is derived from an article by Albert J. Davis, a
Ways and Means Committee member in 2002, devoted to describing in detail the is284
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which a family is eligible in order to maximize the total benefit received is challenging. One impediment to choosing the optimum
mix of college tax expenditures derives from the fact that the subsidy
values of the individual tax exceptions are calculated differently. For
example, the college tax credits reduce tax payable on a dollar-fordollar basis, whereas the subsidy value of the education-related deductions and exclusions is calculated by multiplying the amount of
the deduction/exclusion by the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. This
difference may not be readily apparent to the average taxpayer.
Compounding this problem is the fact that all or a part of the subsidy
associated with the education-related tax credits may be recaptured
293
under the alternative minimum tax system.
Choice complexity is amplified by the fact that Congress enacted
coordinating provisions designed to prevent a taxpayer from obtaining multiple tax exceptions for any given dollar of higher education
expense. For example, eligible expenses for purposes of the higher
education deduction must be reduced by the amount of those expenses covered by the earnings portion of any tax-free distribution
294
A similar provision
from a 529 plan or Coverdell savings account.
prevents a taxpayer from using the same dollar of higher education
expense to support an education credit and a tax-free distribution
295
from a college savings plan. Still another provision prevents a family from claiming a higher education deduction in any year that an
296
education credit is claimed.
The coordinating provisions between the tax-favored college savings plans are equally complex. Prior to 2001, a 6% excise tax was
imposed on contributions to a Coverdell account if the contributions
were made by anyone to a 529 plan for the benefit of the same bene297
ficiary in the same year, and vice versa. EGTRRA repealed that excise tax, and now contributions can be made to both types of plans
298
However,
for the benefit of the same beneficiary in the same year.
sue of complexity at the taxpayer level with regard to choosing among the various tax
programs for higher education. See Albert J. Davis, Choice Complexity in Tax Benefits for
Higher Education, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 509 (2002).
293
Id. at 512; see also Long, supra note 233, at 110.
294
I.R.C. § 222(c)(2)(B) (2000 Supp. I).
295
Id. §§ 529(c)(3)(B)(v), 530(d)(2)(C)(i).
296
Id. § 222(c)(2)(A).
297
STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 107TH CONGRESS—BLUE BOOK, at 37 (2003), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Documents.asp?section=8 (follow link to report).
298
Note that this provision effectively writes the annual contribution limit on
Coverdell accounts out of the Internal Revenue Code if a family is willing to set up
both a 529 plan and a Coverdell account for the same beneficiary.
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if distributions from a 529 plan and a Coverdell account on behalf of
the same beneficiary are made in a single year, and those distributions exceed the beneficiary’s qualified higher education expenses
for that year (after a reduction for the expenses covered by the education credits), the excess expenses must be allocated among the distributions to determine the amount excludable under each provi299
This opaque matrix of coordinating provisions, combined
sion.
with differences in eligibility criteria and in the calculation of subsidy
value, makes it difficult for taxpayers to choose the most beneficial
mix of tax benefits.
An additional type of choice complexity unique to 529 plans is
directly related to the overwhelming number of programs available to
families. Every state and the District of Columbia now offer a college
savings 529 plan, and fourteen states and a consortium of institutions
300
offer prepaid 529 plans.
There are significant substantive differences among the various plans. For example, 529 plans can differ in ,
the availability of a state income tax deduction, residency requirements, fees, minimum and maximum contribution amounts, refund
policies, and the availability of a state guarantee on the rate of return
301
It is a Herculean task to determine at the time
in prepaid plans.
the account is created (which may be eighteen years before the funds
will actually be used), which plan offers the best combination of
benefits for a particular family.
Choice complexity is also affected by the temporary nature and
uncertain future of several of the tax provisions enacted under
EGTRRA. All of the higher education tax benefits enacted under
302
EGTTRA are subject to the sunset provision of that Act, and will
automatically expire on their own terms on December 31, 2010
303
unless an intervening Congress extends them.
Additionally, as
originally enacted, the deduction for qualified higher education expenses was a temporary provision applicable to tax years 2002–2007
299

I.R.C. §§ 529(c)(3)(B)(vi), 530(d)(2)(C)(ii) (2000 Supp. I).
For a complete listing of individual states’ plans, see Savingforcollege.com, 529
Plans, http://www.savingforcollege.com/529_plan_details/ (last visited Mar. 3,
2007).
301
See generally LEVINE, supra note 275, 18–46 (chart detailing state level variances
in 529 plans).
302
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10716, § 901(a), 115 Stat. 38, 150 (2001) (providing that “[a]ll provisions of, and
amendments made by, this Act shall not apply (1) to taxable, plan, or limitation years
beginning after December 31, 2010”).
303
Note that the Pension Protection Act of 2006 made the tax benefits of 529
plans enacted under EGTRRA permanent. Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1304, 120 Stat.
780, 1109 (2006).
300
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304

only. Although this provision was recently extended through 2007,
305
its future remains uncertain.
The final level of complexity is at the system-wide level. Delivering these educational subsidies through the tax system, rather than
through traditional aid channels, shifts the responsibility for their
306
administration and enforcement from the DOE to the IRS.
The
IRS lacks the expertise in the higher education area that the DOE
possesses. As a result, the IRS relies heavily on third party reporting
by various institutions, including colleges and universities, state agencies, and financial intermediaries to ensure that eligibility requirements are met and that the anti-double dipping rules are not violated. Much of the information requested of these third parties by
the IRS is already in the possession of the DOE, resulting in duplica307
tion of efforts and burdens.
V. TREATMENT OF TAX BENEFITS UNDER THE
FEDERAL METHODOLOGY
In the previous section, the tax benefits for higher education
were analyzed in isolation under the norms of equity, efficiency and
complexity. These college tax expenditures for higher education do
not operate in a vacuum. They interact with Title IV through the FM.
This interaction adds to the complexity of Title IV and detracts from
its overall progressiveness.
As previously described, eligibility for need-based financial aid
under Title IV is based on a family’s demonstrated financial need.
Under the FM, need is determined by subtracting from the cost of at308
The EFC is the amount that the fedtendance the student’s EFC.
eral government expects the family to contribute from its own income and assets before any federal financial assistance will be
available. In effect, the FM assesses the income and assets of the family in order to determine their level of unmet need.
Recall that the EFC assessment rates for income are applied to a
base called “available income,” which is defined as “total income” less
309
certain allowances, including one for federal income taxes payable.
Recall also that the starting point for calculating “total income” is
304

See I.R.C. § 222(e) (2000 Supp. I).
Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat.
2922 (2006).
306
See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 228, at 106.
307
JACKSON, supra note 72, at 21.
308
See supra Part III.B.
309
See supra notes 125–38 and accompanying text.
305
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AGI. By defining “available income” with reference to AGI and federal taxes payable, the FM inherently incorporates into its base for assessment the effects of any tax preference items that affect AGI
and/or federal income taxes payable. The tax benefits for higher
education are included in those tax preference items.
It is important to understand the income tax effect of the various
tax incentives for higher education before attempting to comprehend how those income tax effects are incorporated into the federal
financial aid formula. The deduction for qualified tuition and re310
lated expenses reduces a taxpayer’s AGI by the amount deducted.
Reducing AGI by the amount of the education-related deduction in
turn reduces the amount of federal income taxes payable. The actual
amount of the reduction in taxes payable is equal to the amount of
the reduction in AGI multiplied by the taxpayer’s marginal income
311
tax rate.
To summarize, claiming an education-related tax deduction causes a simultaneous decrease in AGI and a smaller decrease in
income taxes payable. The exclusion of earnings on tax-favored college savings plans has a similar simultaneous effect on a taxpayer’s
312
AGI and federal income tax payable.
Since the EFC uses “available income” as its assessment tax base,
and since “available income” is defined by reference to AGI and the
amount of federal taxes payable, the dual income tax effects of claiming an education-related tax deduction or exclusion (decrease in
AGI, decrease in federal taxes payable) will be captured by the FM. A
reduction in AGI, for income tax purposes, resulting from claiming a
higher education-related deduction or exclusion will result in a concomitant reduction in “available income” under the EFC formula.
Simultaneously, the reduction in income taxes payable resulting from
claiming an education-related deduction or exclusion will cause a
smaller increase in “available income,” since income taxes payable is
an offset to “available income” under the FM. The net effect is an
overall decrease in “available income” under the EFC calculation.
This will result in a proportionate decrease in the family’s EFC, which

310

I.R.C. § 62(a)(18) (2000 Supp. I). Under these sections, the deduction for
qualified tuition and related expenses is “above the line,” or allowable against gross
income in arriving at AGI. Id.
311
This calculation becomes more complicated if, as a result of the change in
AGI, the taxpayer’s marginal rate bracket changes. For simplicity’s sake, I assume
that the reduction in AGI does not change the taxpayer’s marginal rate bracket.
312
The effect on AGI of an exclusion from income is equivalent to inclusion of
the same amount in gross income coupled with a deduction allowable in arriving at
AGI.
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will increase its eligibility for need-based Title IV student aid.
It is
worth reflecting on this result—the receipt of a non-need-based federal higher education subsidy in the form of a tax deduction or exclusion will increase a family’s eligibility for need-based federal higher
educational subsidies under Title IV. For example, all else being
equal, a parent of a dependent student who is otherwise in the 28%
marginal income tax bracket that claims the maximum deduction for
tuition and related expenses in 2006 of $4,000 will see the student’s
EFC decrease by as much as $1,354 resulting in an equal increase in
314
the student’s eligibility for need-based aid under Title IV in 2007.
While an education-related tax deduction or exclusion simultaneously affects AGI and income tax payable, an education-related tax
credit affects only income taxes payable by reducing such amount on
a dollar-for-dollar basis by the amount of the credit claimed. Since
federal income taxes payable operate as a direct offset to “total income” in arriving at “available income” under the EFC, any decrease
in income taxes payable caused by claiming an education-related tax
credit should cause an equal increase in “available income.” The resulting proportionate increase in the family’s EFC should reduce its
eligibility for need-based aid under Title IV. However, the expected
result is foreclosed by a provision in the HEA that specifically prevents the amount of an education-related tax credit from being taken
into account as an asset or income of either the parent or student in
315
As a result, claiming an education credit will
calculating the EFC.
313

The amount of the actual decrease in the EFC will depend on the assessment
rate applied to total income under the FM, which in turn depends on whether the
students’ or parents’ EFC is being calculated. A $1.00 decrease in total income of
the student will result in a $.50 decrease in EFC. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. A $1.00 decrease in the total income of the parent will result in a $.22 to
$.47 decrease in EFC, depending on the marginal assessment rate applied to the
parent’s total income under the FM. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
314
Total income is decreased by $4,000. Federal tax payable is decreased by
$1,120 (28% of $4,000). Accordingly, the net change on available income is $2,880
($4,000–$1,120). Assuming the parent’s available income is subject to the highest
marginal rate under the FM of 47%, the net decrease in EFC would be $1,354 (47%
of $2,880). There is a possibility that the amount of any education-related income
tax deduction or exclusion could be treated as an item of untaxed income that is
added to total income in arriving at available income. However, neither Congress
nor the DOE currently requires this treatment, possibly because of the complexity
involved in actually accounting for the combined income tax effects of these tax expenditures under the FM. Also, given the preferred treatment of the educationrelated tax credits under the FM, a good argument can be made that Congress intended these tax benefits for higher education to be in addition to Title IV aid.
Therefore, excluding them from consideration as an item of untaxed income under
the FM seems proper.
315
20 U.S.C. § 1087vv(a)(2) (2000).
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not reduce a family’s eligibility for need-based aid compared to what
316
it would have been had the credit not been claimed.
The effect of claiming an education-related tax credit on eligibility for need-based Title IV aid should be compared to the effect of
claiming an earned income tax credit (EITC). The EITC is refundable tax credit that operates as a wage supplement to low-income
working families. The largest beneficiaries of EITC dollars are fami317
lies with children earning under $35,000.
Since 84% of Pell grant
recipients are from families earning $40,000 or less, there is substantial overlap in the population receiving the EITC and the Pell grant.
The EFC formula, which determines eligibility for a Pell grant, requires the amount of any EITC to be added back to AGI as an item of
318
untaxed income subject to assessment under the FM.
Thus, a lowincome family will see its eligibility for Title IV need-based aid decrease as a result of claiming an EITC, while a middle-income family
will realize no adverse impact on eligibility for Title IV need-based aid
as a result of claiming an education-related credit. This is a particularly harsh result given the fact many lower-income families, who do
not have enough positive tax liability to claim an aid system advantaged education-related credit, will be able to claim an aid system disadvantaged EITC because of its refund feature.
To summarize, claiming an income tax deduction or exclusion
for higher education increases eligibility for need-based aid under Title IV, while claiming an education-related income tax credit is neutral with regard to eligibility for need-based aid. With regard to the
effect of the education-related credits, this was clearly the intended
result. A 1998 letter sent by the DOE explicitly expressed the administration’s view that the amount of any education-related credit
319
claimed should not displace any Title IV need-based aid.
316

The EFC formula technically gets to this result by reducing AGI by the amount
of the credit claimed, effectively treating the amount of the credit as an item of taxable income that is excluded from available income when calculating the EFC. FSA
HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 17–18 (requiring the amount of any education credit
to be listed on Worksheet C Excluded Income).
317
ALAN BERUBE, THE NEW SAFETY NET: HOW THE TAX CODE HELPED LOW-INCOME
FAMILIES DURING THE EARLY 2000S, at 2 (2006), http://www.brookings.edu/metro
/pubs/eitc/20060209_newsafety.pdf.
318
20 U.S.C. § 1087vv(b)(8) (2000).
319
Letter ANN-98-16 from Richard W. Riley (December 1998), available at
http://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/doc0497_bodyoftext.htm.
Specifically, the letter
stated that
[i]n developing these tax credits, we wanted to ensure that they would
provide additional help for families to pay for college and not simply substitute for existing sources of financial assistance. At the Federal level, we
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However, the aid eligibility effect of claiming a deduction for
higher education expenses is probably a result of legislative oversight
rather than explicit legislative intent. Considering that Congress enacted the deduction for higher education expenses as an alternative
to either of the education-related credits for those families whose AGI
exceeded the income thresholds, the difference in aid eligibility effects between the two types of tax subsidies seems irreconcilable. Furthermore, if you account for the difference in distributional impact,
the result seems somewhat perverse. The majority of the benefits of
the deduction for higher education expenses accrue to families with
cash incomes between $100,000 and $200,000, whereas the majority
of the benefits of the Hope credit and LLC accrue to families with
320
cash incomes between $50,000 and $100,000.
With regard to eligibility for Title IV aid, it would be difficult to ascribe to Congress an
explicit legislative intent to advantage higher-income families claiming the tuition and fees deduction over relatively lower-income families claiming the education-related credits. However, the lack of coordination between the various programs under the two systems of
federal college financial aid results in exactly this outcome.
As indicated above, Congress intended the tax deduction and
credits for higher education to be in addition to any amounts of financial aid available under Title IV. While it is true that the amount
of any education-related credit or deduction claimed under the tax
system will not reduce eligibility for a Pell grant under Title IV (it
may even increase it), the converse is not also true. The amount of a
Pell grant received under Title IV will reduce on a dollar-for-dollar
basis the amount of expenses eligible to be claimed as a tuition credit
321
In one sense, it makes sense to disallow a double
or deduction.
federal subsidy for a single dollar of higher education expense.
However, this rationale would apply only if the higher education ex-

did not want to force any student to lose a Pell Grant, for example, as a
result of benefiting from a tax credit. Consequently, . . . Congress enacted . . . a change to the eligibility formulas to ensure that receipt of a . .
. tax credit would not reduce any student’s eligibility for Federal student
financial assistance.
Id.
320

Burman et al., supra note 25, at tbls. 3–5; see id. at tbl. 3 (for a definition of cash
income).
321
See I.R.C. § 25A(g)(2)(A) (2000) (requiring a reduction in the amount of
qualified tuition and related expenses by the amount of any qualified scholarship excludable from gross income under I.R.C. § 117, which would include a Pell grant); see
also id. § 222(d)(1) (2000 Supp. I) (incorporating by reference the definition of
qualified tuition and related expenses from the educational credits, including the
offset for the amount of any Pell grant received).

RYAN_FINAL

2008]

1/7/2008 3:39:07 PM

ACCESS ASSURED

49

penses covered by a Pell grant are identical to those covered by the
education-related credits. In fact, they differ. Pell grants cover a
wide range of expenses included in the cost of attendance, including,
322
inter alia, books, supplies, transportation, and room and board.
On the other hand, the education-related credits and deduction are
323
To see the potential
allowed only with respect to tuition and fees.
problem this creates consider this example. Assume that the cost of
attending a university is $2,000, with $1,000 representing tuition and
$1,000 representing room and board. A student who qualifies for a
$500 Pell grant will only have $500 in expenses eligible for an education-related tax credit after accounting for the amount of the Pell
grant. In effect, the income tax rules assume that a Pell grant is applied first to reduce tuition, before offsetting any other higher education expenses. If the education-related credits and deduction were
truly a supplement to Title IV aid, the amount of a Pell grant should
be applied first to expenses not otherwise covered by the educationrelated credits or deduction. In the example, the student would get a
$500 Pell grant and would have $1,000 in qualifying tuition expenses
eligible for the Hope credit or LLC. Congress could also choose to
deal with this problem by adopting the same definition of qualifying
expenses under both the tax system and Title IV.
The education-related tax deduction and credits are not the only
college tax expenditures that interact with Title IV under the FM.
Since the EFC formula assesses not only the income but also the assets of a family with a student in college, the income-tax-advantaged
educational savings vehicles also potentially interact with the FM.
There has been inconsistency over time, and across savings vehicles,
as to how to treat the asset balances in these plans under the federal
needs analysis.
Prior to 2006, Congress statutorily prescribed the federal methodology’s treatment of only prepaid 529 plans. For all of the other
education-related savings vehicles, it left the difficult policy questions
about their proper treatment under the expected family contribution
formula to the DOE. The original HEA rule with regard to prepaid
529 plans required the amount of any distribution from such a plan
to be treated as offsetting the cost of attendance under the FM on a
324
dollar-for-dollar basis, thereby reducing the qualified beneficiary’s
322

See 20 U.S.C. § 1087ll (2000) (giving a complete listing of the expenses allowed
in calculating the COA).
323
See I.R.C §§ 25A (g)(2)(A), 222(d)(1) (2000 Supp. I).
324
20 U.S.C. § 1087vv(j) (2000); see also Letter GEN-04-02 from Sally Stroup, Assistant Sec’y for Postsecondary Educ. to Colleagues (Jan. 22, 2004) (describing treat-
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eligibility for need-based Title IV aid by the dollar amount of the pre325
paid 529 plan distribution. The prepaid 529 plan balance itself was
326
not further assessed as an asset by the FM.
With regard to Coverdell accounts, the DOE originally took the
position that these accounts should be treated as an asset of the bene327
ficiary-student in calculating the student’s EFC under the FM. This
treatment by the FM resulted in the balance in a Coverdell account
reducing a student’s eligibility for need-based Title IV aid at rate of
328
In addition, since there was no asset protection al35% per year.
lowance applied to a student’s contribution from assets under the
EFC formula, the entire balance of a Coverdell account was subject to
329
assessment.
Prior to 2006, the DOE treated 529 savings plans (as opposed to
529 prepaid plans) as assets of the account owner, which were entered into the calculation of a student’s EFC only if the student or
330
The FM treated a student-owned 529 savparent were the owner.
ings plan identically to a Coverdell account. On the other hand, a
parent-owned 529 savings plan was assessed by the EFC formula at the
331
Accordingly, the balance in a
more favorable parental asset rates.
parent-owned 529 savings plan was subject to a maximum assessment
332
rate of only 5.64% per year.
In addition to a lower marginal assessment rate, the effective assessment rate applied to a parent-owned
529 savings plan was even lower because of the availability of an asset
333
protection allowance. In addition, a 529 savings plan for the benefit of a student could avoid assessment by the FM if a grandparent or
other relative owned the account.
ment of 529 prepaid plans under FM), available at http://www.ifap.ed.gov/
dpcletters/GEN0402.html.
325
Recall that under the FM, need is equal to COA less the EFC. Accordingly, reducing the COA by the amount of the prepaid 529 plan distribution resulted in an
exactly equivalent reduction in need. See generally LINDA LEVINE & CHARMAINE
MERCER, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, TAX FAVORED HIGHER EDUCATION SAVINGS BENEFITS
AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO TRADITIONAL FEDERAL AID, 2006, at 21–28 (2006).
326
FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 20.
327
See 2001–2002 FEDERAL STUDENT AID HANDBOOK, APPLICATION AND VERIFICATION
GUIDE 22 (2001), available at http://www.ifap.ed.gov/sfahandbooks/attachments
/0102AVGCh2appquestions.pdf [hereinafter FSA HANDBOOK 2001–2002] (providing
that Education IRAs should be treated as an asset of the student).
328
See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
329
See note 142.
330
See, e.g., FSA HANDBOOK 2001–2002, supra note 327, at 23; Letter from Stroup,
supra note 324.
331
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
332
See id.
333
See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
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In early 2004, the DOE changed course regarding the treatment
of Coverdell accounts by the FM. In a “Dear Colleague” letter to all
financial aid officers, the DOE provided a “clarification on the treatment of . . . educational savings plans in the determination of . . . eli334
gibility for Federal student aid.” The letter indicated that Coverdell
accounts would be treated the same as 529 savings plans under the
335
FM. As a result, the asset balances in Coverdell accounts education
savings plans were treated as an asset of the account owner in calculating the student’s EFC. This allowed parent-owned Coverdell accounts to enjoy the lower assessment rate and the asset protection allowance normally applied to parental assets under the EFC. The
difference in treatment between prepaid 529 plans, on the one hand,
and college savings 529 plans and Coverdell accounts, on the other
hand, remained.
Under HERA 2005, Congress fixed this anomaly by repealing the
provisions of Title IV that treated distributions from prepaid 529
336
plans as offsetting the COA on a dollar-for-dollar basis.
Congress
also provided that no matter who owned the account, the asset value
in a tax-favored college savings plan would not be considered as an
337
These two changes
asset of a dependent student under the FM.
removed the historical competitive disadvantages of prepaid 529
plans as compared to 529 savings plans and Coverdell accounts. According to the DOE, the net result of these changes with regard to
dependent students is that the only way the value of an income-tax
advantaged college savings plan would be included in the calculation
338
of a student’s EFC is if the parent were the account owner.
While Congress aligned the treatment of all types of tax-favored
college savings plans under Title IV, questions still remain as to
whether the current treatment is the proper one. The most glaring
problem with the statutorily-prescribed treatment of college savings
plans under the FM is the ability to completely escape assessment by
simply naming a grandparent, other relative, or close advisor as the
account owner. Escaping assessment means that the college savings
334

Letter from Stroup, supra note 324.
Id.
336
20 U.S.C.A. § 1087vv(f)(5) (West 2006) (creating a new category of assets
named qualified education benefits and including in that category both types of 529
plans and Coverdell accounts).
337
Id. § 1087vv(f)(3).
338
Letter GEN-06-05 from Susan Beaudoin, Office of Postsecondary Educ., and
Theresa S. Shaw, Chief Operating Officer Fed. Student Aid (April 2006) (discussing
changes made by HERA 2005 to certain provisions of Title IV of the HEA), available
at http://www.ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/GEN0605.html.
335
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plan balance, no matter how large, will not be counted as a resource
available to be put towards the student’s higher education expenses
under the FM. This leads to inequities in the overall distribution of
Title IV funds. Consider two students, each with equal amounts of
family income and wealth, both of whom are applying for Title IV
need-based aid in order to attend the same four-year public undergraduate institution. However, one student is the beneficiary of a
339
grandparent-owned 529 plan with a balance of $11,000. Under the
current rules, both students will qualify for the same amount of Title
IV need-based aid, despite the fact that the 529 plan beneficiary’s ac340
tual need is less than the other student’s need.
Perhaps this should not be considered too much of an equity
problem because any Title IV need-based aid claimed will displace
the 529 funds and leave a balance remaining in the account upon
matriculation, necessitating a non-qualifying distribution incurring
341
an income and penalty tax. The response to this argument is threefold. First, in the event that excess funds remain in the 529 plan
upon matriculation, the liberal rollover and change in beneficiary
rules for 529 plans would allow the grandparent to rollover the account balance to another grandchild’s account or simply name another grandchild as beneficiary to avoid the consequences of a non342
qualifying distribution. Additionally, even if a rollover or benefici-

339

The average account balance in a college savings 529 plan in 2006 was $10,569.
TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 24 fig. 15.
340
One criticism of this example is that it is unlikely to occur because a student
with a 529 plan balance this large would probably come from a wealthy family and
would not qualify for need-based Title IV aid. While this may be true with regard to
Pell grant recipients, it is not true with regard to subsidized federal student loan recipients. In 2003–2004, 24.5% of dependent students from families with incomes between $80,000 and $99,999, and 11.2% of dependent students from families with incomes over $100,000, received subsidized federal student loans. BERKNER ET AL.,
supra note 109, at 14 tbl. 5.
341
This would occur under the facts as given under several reasonable assumptions. If we assume the student attended a public four-year institution as an in-state
resident where the average cost of attendance was $16,357 per year in 2005–2006, the
student would need a total of $65,428 to cover his total cost of attendance over a
four-year period. TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2006, supra note 96, at 6 fig. 2. In addition, if we assume the dependent undergraduate student received the 2003–2004 average amount of federal loans, grants, and work-study awards, then Title IV aid
would amount to $9,500 per year, or $38,000 over a four-year period. STUDENT
FINANCIAL AID ESTIMATES, supra note 109, at 5. The sum of Title IV aid plus the 529
plan balance would be $49,000. Under these average assumptions, there would be
$16,428 remaining in the 529 plan at the end of the four years, assuming the grandparent requires the student to exhaust his or her Title IV aid before 529 plan distributions would be made.
342
See supra notes 206–08 and accompanying text.
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ary change is not possible, a penalty tax may not apply because of the
exception for a distribution on account of a scholarship or other al343
Lastly, even if an income and penalty tax is imposed on
lowance.
the 529 plan beneficiary, it does not help the other student whose
share of Title IV need-based aid was less because of having to share
the limited pool of federal Title IV funds with the 529 plan beneficiary.
It is also not clear that an income and penalty tax overcomes the
exclusion of the asset from assessment under Title IV in the first instance. These tax-favored savings plans represent funds specifically
set aside to pay for the designated beneficiary’s postsecondary education expenses. It seems odd that the FM does not count these assets
as resources available to be put towards this very purpose. While the
exemption of home equity and retirement assets from assessment
under Title IV may be justified by a balancing of conflicting federal
policies with regard to encouraging education, home ownership, and
retirement savings, no such conflicting policy exists with regard to
college savings plans. Indeed, the income tax exemption granted to
these plans is premised on the funds being actually put towards the
payment of higher education expenses. Title IV should further this
income tax policy by capturing the balances in college savings plans
under the EFC formula as assets available to pay for college.
VI. CONSOLIDATION AND COORDINATION
This Part illustrates that significant equity, efficiency, and simplicity gains in the overall distribution of federal higher education
dollars can be realized by consolidating substantially similar college
tax programs and by coordinating the benefits provided under both
tax and transfer systems to achieve an overall progressive distribution
in federal higher education dollars.
A. Consolidation
1.

Grant-Like Tax Programs

The Hope scholarship credit, the LLC, and the higher education
tax deduction all operate as tuition subsidies reimbursing families for
tuition payments previously made. These substantially similar grantlike higher education tax programs should be consolidated into a
343

See I.R.C. §§ 529(d)(6), 530(d)(4)(B)(iii) (2000 Supp. I) (note the exception
to penalty taxation only applies “to the extent the amount of the payment or distribution does not exceed the amount of the scholarship, allowance, or payment”).
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single refundable college tax credit with an advance payment fea344
This type of tax subsidy would be distributionally superior to
ture.
the existing education-related credits and deduction. Furthermore, a
single refundable college tax credit with an advance payment mechanism is more likely than any of the existing tuition tax subsidies to
further the dual public policy goals of increased access and afforda345
bility in higher education.
Lastly, a consolidated college tax credit
will reduce choice complexity at the taxpayer level.
Similar to its nonrefundable brethren, a refundable tax credit
reduces income tax payable on a dollar-for-dollar basis regardless of
346
the taxpayer’s marginal income tax rate bracket.
This avoids the
regressive distribution of benefits associated with the tuition tax de347
duction.
However, a refundable tax credit goes further, delivering
its subsidy to an eligible family regardless of the existence or level of
348
income tax payable.
After reducing income tax to zero, a family
with excess credit eligibility would receive a cash payment from the
349
government in the amount of such excess. Disconnecting the level
of the subsidy from the amount of income tax owed mitigates the dis350
tributional defects associated with the Hope credit and the LLC.
Recall that to be most effective, higher education subsidies
should be targeted at the most price-sensitive and underrepresented
351
college student population, that is, lower-income students. Title IV
attempts to target its need-based financial aid programs in this man352
ner.
To capture Title IV’s preferred progressive distribution pattern, the maximum refundable education tax credit amount should
344

See Susan Dynarski & Judith Scott-Clayton, Simplify and Focus the Education Tax
Incentives, 111 TAX NOTES 1290 (June 12, 2006) (arguing for a similar single, refundable tax credit delivered at the time of college enrollment).
345
Although this Article speaks of efficiency in terms of the ability of the college
tax expenditures to achieve their stated public policy goals, a recent article made a
strong economic efficiency argument for using a uniform refundable tax credit as
the default form of tax incentive when the goal of the government in enacting the
tax provision is to induce socially desirable behavior generating positive externalities.
See Batchelder et al., supra note 230.
346
See supra notes 232–33 and accompanying text.
347
See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text.
348
SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 228, at 109–110 (recognizing that refundable
credits would allow nontaxpayers to participate in tax expenditure programs but arguing that if the credit amount itself is not taxable, then an additional tax expenditure arises, which “will have the same upside-down effect as a deduction or exclusion”).
349
Id.
350
See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text.
351
See supra Part II.C.
352
See supra Part III.B.
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decrease incrementally as family income increases, with benefits phas353
An AGI cap would preing out up to a predetermined AGI level.
vent windfalls to higher-income taxpayers who would have attended
354
college anyway with or without the subsidy.
Furthermore, to address the timing disadvantage associated with
the current tuition tax credits, the new refundable college tax credit
355
should offer an advance payment option.
Recall that the current
education-related tax credits and deduction operate as reimburse356
ments for tuition payments previously made.
These subsidies simply come too late to meaningfully impact the college enrollment decisions of families lacking the financial wherewithal to pay tuition
payments as they fall due. An advance payment feature would allow a
family to claim the subsidy at the time the tuition bill is due and payable, rather than waiting until April 15th of the following year. This
enhances the ability of the new college tax credit to induce enrollment in students from liquidity constrained families. Both the
357
358
EITC and health coverage tax credit currently offer an advance
payment mechanism.

353

See Batchelder et al., supra note 230, at 27–28 (arguing that uniform refundable tax credits are more economically efficient with regard to tax incentives intended to encourage behavior generating positive externalities but conceding that
non-uniform tax credits may be justified if there are “differences in externalities and
elasticities by income class”).
354
Although this would create steep marginal combined tax and transfer rates in
the consolidated college tax credit phase-out range, such a result is observed in all
income-tested transfer programs. See Alstott, supra note 255, at 550 (providing
graphic illustration of the increase in marginal rates at different income levels that
results in the phase-out range of the earned income tax credit in a hypothetical combined tax and transfer fiscal system).
355
See Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, supra note 344.
356
See supra notes 267–68 and accompanying text.
357
I.R.C. § 32 (2000). The earned income credit advance payment feature allows
taxpayers to receive the credit amount over the course of the year in their regular
paychecks through reduced withholding. Id. § 3507. However, the advance payment
feature is rarely utilized. In 1998, only 1.1% of EITC recipients used the advance
payment option. Joseph Hotz & John Karl Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit, in
MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 58 (Robert A. Moffitt ed.,
2003), cited in David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 1022 (2004); see also George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. OF TAX POL’Y 225, 257–58 (1994) (discussing of the possible causes of
the low take-up rate for the advance EITC).
358
I.R.C. § 35 (2000 Supp. II). The health coverage tax credit, enacted in 2002, is
a refundable tax credit equal to 65% of the cost for coverage under a qualified
health insurance plan for certain eligible individuals. Id. § 35(a). Under the advance payment option, the federal government pays 65% of the health insurance
premium each month directly to the insurer. See generally Health Coverage Tax
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To make college more affordable, a financial subsidy must
meaningfully affect net price, including all relevant costs. Qualified
expenses for purposes of the education-related tax credits and deduc359
tion include only tuition and fees.
Title IV, on the other hand, allows its grants to subsidize the entire cost of attendance, including
360
room, board, books, transportation expenses, etc. All of these costs
factor into a student’s cost-benefit analysis when making the enrollment decision. Accordingly, in order to enhance the ability of the
consolidated refundable college tax credit to increase college attendance by decreasing cost, the new tax credit should adopt Title IV’s
361
expanded definition of COA.
Harmonization of the definition of
qualified expenses should also avoid certain anomalies associated
with the interaction between the two systems when differing eligible
362
expense definitions apply.
Simplicity gains can be realized by reducing choice complexity
faced by taxpayers in determining which of the current tuition tax
363
subsidies for which they are eligible provides the greatest benefit.
Recall that the tuition tax deduction and the tuition tax credits have
364
different AGI limitations. Additionally, the subsidy value of the tuition tax deduction is calculated differently from that of the tuition
365
tax credits. Furthermore, the maximum Hope scholarship amount
is determined under a different formula than the maximum LLC
366
A single refundable college tax credit with a uniform set
amount.
of eligibility criteria and a single subsidy value and maximum amount
would be less complex than the current matrix of tuition tax subsidy
rules. Simple financial aid programs are the ones most likely to affect
367
access.
Credit (HCTC) Overview, available at http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=
109960,00.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2007).
359
See supra note 169 and accompanying text (listing eligible expenses for purposes of Hope credit, LLC, and tuition deduction).
360
See supra note 121 and accompanying text (defining COA under FM which determines Pell grant eligibility).
361
Using the same definition of qualified higher education expenses under the
tax system and Title IV would enhance their compatibility and allow better coordination between the two systems.
362
See supra notes 321–23 and accompanying text.
363
See supra Part IV.B.3.
364
Compare supra note 176 and accompanying text, with note 187 and accompanying text.
365
Compare supra note 228 and accompanying text, with notes 232–33 and accompanying text.
366
Compare supra note 173 and accompanying text, with note 178 and accompanying text.
367
Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, supra note 147, at 319–20.
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Tax-Favored Savings Programs

Currently, college savers must choose between investing in a 529
plan or a Coverdell account. Both types of college savings options offer federal tax advantages designed to induce more college savings.
However, the form of the tax exception, an exclusion from income
for earnings on plan balances, provides the largest benefits to the
wealthiest taxpayers, those most likely to save even in the absence of a
368
subsidy.
Little or no tax benefit is provided to lower-income families, those most in need of an inducement to engage in college sav369
ings. This result is not only distributionally problematic, but it also
hampers the ability of these plans to achieve their public policy goal
of increasing college savings. Furthermore, the sheer number of college savings plan options creates choice complexity at the taxpayer
level, which itself may prove a barrier to entry for the novice potential
370
college saver.
To address these equity, efficiency, and simplicity
concerns, the existing college savings options should be consolidated
into a single college savings plan with a federal match for lower371
income families.
Consolidation of the tax-favored college savings plans into a single college savings vehicle would simplify the savings process once the
college savings decision was made, but it would not induce more college savings among those lower-income families, who are least likely
to save. In order to stimulate new college savings, contributions to
the new consolidated college savings vehicle by low-income families
should be accompanied by a federal match, in the form of a refundable tax credit deposited directly into the college savings account.
This would allow lower-income families to realize an educational subsidy from investing in tax-favored college savings plans without regard
to their marginal income tax rate bracket. A similar credit already exists that provides up to a $2,000 federal match for voluntary contribu372
tions to qualified retirement plans for certain qualified individuals.
The match rate under the existing retirement saver’s credit is progressive, with the match percentage decreasing as family income in373
A college saver’s credit with a similar design would not
creases.
only reduce the regressivity associated with the benefit provided un368

See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text; Part IV.B.2.c.
See id.
370
See supra Part IV.B.3.
371
The consolidated college savings plan could continue to allow for both prepaid
and college savings types of accounts.
372
I.R.C. § 25B(a) (2000 Supp. I).
373
See id. § 25B(b).
369
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der existing college savings plans but would also increase the likelihood that the consolidated program would capture new college sav374
To further mitigate regressivity, AGI limitations, simiings dollars.
lar to those set forth currently for Coverdell accounts, should be
375
imposed on contributors.
A single college savings vehicle with one set of eligibility criteria
will reduce choice complexity at the taxpayer level. For the reasons
cited above, the definition of eligible expenses under the new consolidated savings program should be identical to the definition of
376
COA under Title IV. Coordinating provisions between the consolidated savings plan and the consolidated college tax credit will still be
needed to prevent multiple tax exceptions for the same dollar of
higher education expense. However, such provisions will be less extensive than those currently in place because there will only be two
tax expenditures for higher education requiring coordination.
Finally, annual contribution limits should apply to bring the new
consolidated college savings plan in line with other tax-advantaged
377
retirement and health care individual savings accounts.
By imposing annual contribution limits, the ability of the highest income taxpayers to use these accounts as conduits through which to make
transfer-tax advantaged gifts for non-educational purposes is re378
duced. To further ensure that the funds in these accounts are used
for their intended purposes, the current income and penalty tax
structure should apply to the new consolidated college savings pro379
gram.
B. Coordination Between Tax System and Title IV
Part V described how the current treatment by the FM of the tax
benefits for higher education produces inequitable results with regard to eligibility for need-based Title IV financial aid. Claiming an
education-related deduction or exclusion effectively increases eligibil380
ity for need-based Title IV aid.
Claiming an existing tuition tax
credit does not affect Title IV need-based aid eligibility, even though
374

See supra Part IV.B.2.c.
See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
376
See supra notes 359–62 and accompanying text.
377
See I.R.C. § 408(a)(1) (2000) (annual contribution limits on traditional individual retirement accounts); id. § 408A(c)(2) (annual contribution limits on Roth
individual retirement accounts); § 223(b) (2000 Supp. II) (annual contribution limits on health savings accounts).
378
See supra notes 245–46 and accompanying text.
379
See supra notes 201–05, 220 and accompanying text.
380
See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
375
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381

under the FM it should.
The tortured history of the Title IV treatment of tax-favored college savings plans resulted in legislation that
effectively allows families to self-exempt college savings plan balances
382
from assessment under the FM. These anomalies are largely due to
a lack of coordination between the benefits provided under the two
systems; however, in some cases, it is a direct result of congressional
coordinating directives that aid families able to claim benefits under
both systems. Accordingly, in order to preserve the progressivity
gains in the distribution of federal dollars for higher education realized by consolidating substantially similar tax benefits, this section describes how the consolidated educational tax subsidies should be
treated by the FM under Title IV.
The current education-related tax credits were intended to
383
This is an acceptcomplement Title IV aid rather than displace it.
able policy goal if all families who qualify for need-based Title IV aid
can also claim the tuition tax credits. With regard to lower-income
384
After consolidation, howfamilies, this is generally not the case.
ever, lower-income families could participate in both the refundable
college tax credit program and Title IV need-based aid programs.
Accordingly, it seems proper to continue to disregard the amount of
the consolidated college tax credit for purposes of determining eligibility for need-based Title IV aid under the FM. This would increase
the overall progressivity in the distribution of federal dollars for
higher education, since more total student financial aid would be
385
available to lower-income families.
Furthermore, a single consolidated refundable tax credit uniformly ignored under Title IV will avoid the existing anomalies between the FM treatment of the higher education deduction versus the
386
education-related credits.
Under the current system, a taxpayer
deciding between a tuition tax credit or deduction needs to account
not only for differing subsidy values under the tax system but also for

381

See supra notes 315–16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 324–38 and accompanying text.
383
See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
384
See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text.
385
This results because lower-income families could claim the maximum refundable tax credit amount without negatively impacting their eligibility for Title IV needbased aid. Middle-income taxpayers would qualify for less Title IV aid because of
their reduced level of financial need and may be limited in claiming the maximum
refundable tax credit amount if they are in the phase-out range (and totally excluded
from credit eligibility if their AGI exceeds the statutory limitation).
386
Compare supra notes 313–14 and accompanying text, with supra notes 315–16
and accompanying text.
382
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differing treatment of each type of tax expenditure by the FM. Consolidation and coordination should make the post-income-tax, postFM-assessment, subsidy value of the consolidated college tax credit
more transparent.
Ignoring the new college tax credit under Title IV also harmonizes its FM treatment with that of a Pell grant. Currently, the
amount of any Pell grant received by a student is statutorily excluded
387
Aligning
from consideration as income or an asset under the FM.
the FM treatment of a Pell grant recipient with a consolidated college
tax credit recipient recognizes the similarities between the two types
of federal student aid programs. Both are grant-like tuition subsidies
that are simply delivered through two different distribution
388
channels.
The FM should capture the balance in a new consolidated college savings plan as an asset available to be put towards the designated beneficiary’s higher education expenses. To recap, under the
changes made by HERA, the balance in any type of tax-favored college savings plan is treated as an includable asset under the FM only
389
if the parent is the account owner.
For those parent-owned plans
captured by Title IV, plan balances are assessed at an annual rate of
5.64%, and then only if the plan balances exceed the existing asset

387

20 U.S.C. § 1087vv(a)(2) (2000) (excluding any “portion of any student financial assistance received from any program” from the expected contribution formula
as income or an asset). Absent this provision, a Pell grant, which is excluded from
gross income under I.R.C. § 117, may be considered an item of untaxed income that
is added to the student’s AGI in arriving at student total income under the EFC formula. See supra note 128. The result of this would be to increase available income
and proportionately decrease eligibility for need-based Title IV aid.
388
The similarity between Pell grants and tuition tax subsidies led Dynarski and
Scott-Clayton to argue for consolidation of Pell grants and existing tuition tax subsidies into a simple, single grant program administered through the DOE, using information supplied by the IRS. SUSAN M. DYNARSKI & JUDITH SCOTT-CLAYTON, THE
HAMILTON PROJECT, COLLEGE GRANTS ON A POSTCARD: A PROPOSAL FOR SIMPLE AND
PREDICTABLE FEDERAL STUDENT AID (2007), http://www3.brookings.edu/views/pap
ers/200702dynarski-scott-clayton_pb.pdf; see also David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim,
The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004) (arguing that
substantially similar tax and spending programs should be integrated when such integration would result in better achievement of the public policy at issue and that the
choice between integration into the tax system or the spending system should be a
matter of institutional design). But see Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax and Spending
Programs, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1197 (2006) (arguing that even if integration of similar
tax and spending programs were politically possible, it may result in sole control over
the integrated program being vested in a single Congressional committee, resulting
in a normatively unappealing shift from a system of parallel decision-making to one
of hierarchical decision-making).
389
See supra notes 336–38 and accompanying text.
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390

protection allowance.
An account owned by a student, non-parent
relative, or close advisor is effectively exempted from assessment under the EFC formula. In effect, the tax system provides an exemption
for non-parent owned college savings plans to encourage college savings but Title IV does not consider those savings as available for the
payment of college expenses.
The current treatment by the FM of college savings balances is
too generous and easily manipulated. However, if the FM required
the entire plan balance to offset eligibility for need-based Title IV aid,
families may refrain from investing in these plans and the goal of increasing college savings would be hampered. Accordingly, to ensure
that Title IV captures plan balances, but not in an unduly harsh way
that deters families from engaging in saving for college, the FM
should treat the consolidated college savings plan as an asset of the
designated beneficiary. This was the original approach of the DOE
391
with regard to the needs analysis treatment of Coverdell accounts.
Under current law, this would result in plan balances being subject to
392
assessment under the EFC formula at an annual rate of 20%. Since
there is no asset protection allowance provided for student assets, the
first dollars in the plan would be subject to assessment.
Treating the new consolidated college savings plans as student
assets under the FM would accomplish three important goals. First, it
would align the goals of the tax system and Title IV with regard to
these plans. The federal government offers an income tax exemption to these plans to encourage savings for future college expenses.
Title IV should further this goal by capturing the value in these accounts as available to be put towards their intended purpose. Second, it reduces the inequity associated with the current advantaged
position these assets hold under Title IV as compared to other non393
Lastly, by more accurately reflecttax advantaged forms of savings.
ing a family’s reduced level of need as a result of the existence of a
college savings plan, it increases the overall progressivity in the distribution of Title IV aid.

390

See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text. This would result in a cumulative assessment rate of 21% over a four-year period. Id.
391
See supra notes 327–29 and accompanying text.
392
See supra note 143 and accompanying text. This would result in a cumulative
assessment rate on the college savings plan balance of 59% over a four-year period.
See supra note 250 (author’s own calculation using described formula).
393
See supra notes 339–40 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Attending college is more important and more expensive than
ever. For many potential college students, financial constraints remain a barrier to access. Traditionally, the federal government assisted college students through the progressive spending programs
under Title IV. Over the past decade, however, the federal government increasingly turned to tax expenditures as a way to mitigate the
effects of rising college costs. The addition of the tax benefits for
higher education introduced an unsavory amount of regressivity into
the overall distribution of federal dollars for higher education. Distributionally, the college tax benefits favor middle- and upper-income
families and provide little or no benefit to lower-income families.
Middle-income families can potentially claim educational benefits
under both Title IV and the tax system, while lower-income families
are effectively limited to Title IV subsidies only. Furthermore, the favorable treatment that these college tax subsidies receive under the
FM advantages those middle-income families who claim benefits under both systems. This interaction between the two systems magnifies
the distributional inequities associated with the tax benefits for
higher education standing alone. Consolidating substantially similar
college tax programs and coordinating them with Title IV under the
FM can make significant equity and simplicity gains. Furthermore,
the federal government is more likely to achieve its public policy
goals in providing financial aid, namely, expanding college access, affordability, and savings.

